University of Denver

Digital Commons @ DU
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

University of Denver Sturm College of Law

2014

The Infringement Continuum
Bernard Chao
University of Denver, bchao@law.du.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons

Recommended Citation
Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

The Infringement Continuum
Publication Statement
Originally published as Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359 (2014).
Copyright is held by the author. User is responsible for all copyright compliance.

This article is available at Digital Commons @ DU: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/law_facpub/93

CHAO.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

4/10/2014 2:21 PM

THE INFRINGEMENT CONTINUUM
Bernard Chao †

For many years, patent law has struggled with the issue of permissible
claim scope. A patent’s specification and its claims often suffer from a
surprising disconnect. The specification generally describes an invention in
terms of one or more specific implementations, suggesting a relatively
narrow invention. But claims are drafted far more broadly. They frequently
encompass unforeseen variations and even cover after-arising technology.
Although there are numerous existing doctrines that try to prevent
claims from straying too far from their specification, these doctrines offer
binary outcomes ill suited for patent law. Under these doctrines, as a claim
encompasses subject matter further and further away from what the
specification describes, there is a point where the inventor suddenly loses all
rights. These outcomes make sense when all trespasses are considered equal
wrongs. However, in reality, there is an infringement continuum. At one
end of the continuum, infringement can look exactly like the invention
described by a patent. That infringement should be treated far more
seriously than infringement that resides at the other end of the continuum
and looks very different from the invention.
Consequently, I propose a new theoretical framework that ties patent
disclosure doctrine to the remedies the law provides. Although I would
continue to use the claims to determine infringement, I suggest that the
specification be used to assess the remedy. Specifically, I suggest replacing
the current lost profits/reasonable royalty framework with one based on
royalties that consider disclosure principles. The size of the royalty would be
determined by comparing the infringement to the patent specification and
adjusting the royalty based on the degree of similarity.
The proposal improves on existing doctrines in two fundamental ways.
First, instead of offering binary outcomes, the proposed remedies are highly
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adjustable. Therefore, they are well suited for addressing the full
infringement continuum. Second, this proposal does not just focus on the
patentee’s injury, as does the current law. Rather, it advances the public
interest by optimizing incentives for both initial and follow-on innovators.
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, patent law has struggled with the issue of
permissible claim scope. A patent’s specification and its claims often
suffer from a surprising disconnect.1 The specification generally
describes an invention in terms of one or more specific
1 A specification is a written description of the invention, while a patent’s claims delineate
the boundaries of the property right. See infra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
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implementations, suggesting a relatively narrow invention. But claims
are drafted far more broadly. They frequently encompass unforeseen
variations and even cover after-arising technology.
This Article argues that patent law should manage overbroad
claims by fundamentally changing the way patent law looks at its
remedies. Patent law has always viewed patents like personal property
and attempted to restore the patentees to the place they would have
occupied had there been no infringement. But these “make whole”
remedies are inconsistent with the professed goal of patent law—
maximizing innovation in the name of the public welfare. 2 For patent
law to be faithful to this view, it should not be single mindedly focused
on redressing the inventor’s injury. Rather, the law needs to be
concerned about providing incentives for both patentees and any
infringers that build on a patentee’s work.
To allocate incentives properly, the law needs to be able to tune the
remedy to match the full range of potential infringements. We can
consider different types of infringement as falling along a continuum. At
one end of the continuum, infringement can look exactly like the
invention described by a patent. At the other end, infringement can be
very different from the invention. Broad claims often reach deeply into
this continuum. These broad claims cause significant problems. When
claims reach technology that is too far afield from the invention,
patentees are rewarded for something they did not invent and later
innovators are unnecessarily burdened.
A number of existing patent doctrines attempt to address this
problem. The enablement requirement, written description
requirement, claim construction, subject matter patentability, and the
reverse doctrine of equivalents all limit broad claims to one degree or
another. Nonetheless, defining just how broadly inventors may claim
their inventions has proven to be extremely challenging. The
jurisprudence of these doctrines is confusing and often yields
unpredictable results.
Numerous commentators have proposed various changes to these
claim-limiting doctrines. For example, certain Federal Circuit judges
advocate interpreting claims more narrowly based on the embodiments
found in the specification. 3 Other commentators suggest transforming
the subject matter eligibility requirement so that its sole function would
be to address overbroad claims. 4 But no matter how the law might
tinker with these standards and tests, these doctrines all suffer from one
fundamental limitation. They yield only two outcomes. If the patentee is
2 Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 529–
36 (2014).
3 See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
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allowed to enforce a broad claim, all of patent law’s remedies are
available. On the other hand, if the claim is determined to be too broad,
the patentee recovers nothing. Doctrines that only have binary
outcomes will never be able to effectively handle the range of
infringements that reside on the continuum.
Accordingly, I propose a more nuanced approach to the problem
of overbroad claims. My proposal does not try to fix the different
doctrines that limit claim scope and make them more predictable. To
some extent, these problems are intractable. Instead, I suggest that
patent law replace its current lost-profits/reasonable-royalty framework
with a single royalty system that considers the proximity of the
infringement to the invention. Under this theory, the patentee’s remedy
diminishes when the nature of the infringement looks less and less like
what the specification describes. This theory is unconcerned with what
the patentee lost and instead focuses on the relative contribution the
patent made to the infringing device. By rethinking patent remedies in
terms of disclosure principles, the proposal described in this Article
tailors the remedy to better address the infringement continuum.
Consequently, this proposal improves on existing doctrines that only
offer binary outcomes.
Part I of this Article explains why claims can look so much broader
than the invention the patentee describes and the difficulties this creates.
Under the current system of peripheral claiming, patents consist of both
a written specification and claims. The specification teaches the public
how to practice the invention while the claims define the property right.
In practice, specifications describe one or more specific embodiments of
the invention. But patent attorneys intentionally draft the claims as
broadly as possible. In many cases, these claims end up covering
variations or improvements that have little resemblance to the original
invention. 5 Such overbroad claims reward inventors for technology that
they did not invent and unnecessarily burden downstream innovation.
The problem of broad claims is exacerbated by the problem of
unclear claims. Patent claims use words to try to describe the scope of
technical concepts. To do so precisely is probably impossible. 6 There are
always disputes around what claims mean and even the proper
methodology for interpreting those claims. The result is that patent
5 Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 5 (2009) (noting that the doctrine of equivalents also “grants protection to patent
holders for creations that by definition were not—and indeed could not have been—in their
possession at the time of their patent applications”); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1005 (1997) (“[P]atent claims
may reach new and unanticipated inventions made after the patent issues, but which fall within
the literal language of the claims.”).
6 See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 259 (2008).
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scope is notoriously unpredictable. Because of this uncertainty,
companies may avoid using technology not covered by a patent or
simply pay undeserved licensing fees. Alternatively, companies may roll
the dice and let the courts tell them if they are infringing a patent. Each
of these choices burdens innovation in different ways.
Part II discusses the various patent doctrines that are used to
restrain claims from straying too far from their specification. Several
doctrines declare that overly broad claims are invalid. Chief among
these is the enablement requirement; it requires that the written
specification enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the
claimed invention. If the specification fails to teach the full scope of the
claim, that claim is invalid. Applying different tests, the written
description and subject matter patentability requirements also can be
used to invalidate claims that cover subject matter that departs too far
from the specification.
Other patent doctrines leave broad claims intact, but constrain
their scope. Courts can use the patent’s specification to interpret claims
narrowly. Thus, even when claims are drafted broadly, they may not
reach as far as the patentee intended. These cases typically result in a
finding of non-infringement. The little-used reverse doctrine of
equivalents applies to subject matter that falls within the literal scope of
a claim. The doctrine says that there is no infringement because the
subject matter departs too far from the spirit of the invention.
All these claim-limiting doctrines share two important
characteristics. First, for the most part, these doctrines involve
complicated concepts that make them difficult to apply. Consequently,
outcomes are unpredictable. Second, all these doctrines have all-ornothing outcomes. Under the enablement, written description, and
subject matter patentability doctrines, a claim is either valid or invalid.
When the courts interpret claims or look to the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, the result leads to a finding of infringement or noninfringement.
These all-or-nothing outcomes are a poor match for the different
kinds of infringement that exist. There are countless flavors of potential
infringement. This “infringement continuum” reflects varying degrees
of potential claim scope. Although reasonable minds may disagree on
how far into the continuum a patent should reach, no one should
dispute that some kinds of infringements should be treated more
seriously than others. A company that does precisely what the patent
describes owes a greater debt to the patentee than a company that
modifies the invention in some unforeseen ways or adds its own
contributions. Relying on this basic insight, this Article proposes a
different-remedies framework that compares the infringement to what
the patent discloses.
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The concept of tying patent remedies to disclosure principles can
trace its roots to two different sets of existing proposals—adjusting the
law of permanent injunctions and central claiming. Part III describes
these proposals and explains how the current reform builds upon them.
Several commentators argue that courts should not grant permanent
injunctions when an infringing product significantly improves on the
patentee’s invention. In effect, these proposals suggest that the
patentee’s remedy should be reduced when the infringement looks less
like the patentee’s original invention. But because these proposals only
rely upon a single coarse lever (i.e., whether to grant a permanent
injunction), they do not account for all the different kinds of
infringement that exist. This Article takes the next step and suggests that
money damages should be based on the proximity of the infringement
to the patentee’s original invention. Since there is a large range of
potential money damages, this reform can better account for all the
types of infringement that lie on the continuum.
Other commentators argue that U.S. patent law should return to a
system of central claiming. This means that infringement
determinations would be made by relying on the specification instead of
the claims. The proposal would also place less weight on a patent’s
claims and more weight on the patent’s specification. But instead of
trying to fix claim scope, it assumes that the problem will always be with
us. Consequently, the proposed reform attempts to adjust patent
remedies to account for this uncertainty.
Part IV describes a proposal for basing money damages on the
infringement continuum. It first critiques the existing reasonableroyalty/lost-profits framework. Both of these theories misguidedly focus
on making patentees “whole” by returning them to the place they would
have occupied had there been no infringement. But the goal of patent
law is to promote the sciences. Any benefit that inventors receive is
simply a necessary side effect of incentivizing innovation. The current
system makes patentees whole at the cost of disincentivizing those who
would build on existing technology. In contrast, using the infringement
continuum to calculate damages would incentivize both the patentee
and any innovating infringer by apportioning profits between them.
Part V goes on to identify several important characteristics of a
remedies reform that would use the infringement continuum to
determine money damages in patent cases. Specifically, this Article
argues that the law should eliminate the current bifurcated lostprofits/reasonable-royalty regime and just use a royalty-based system.
This “new” royalty calculation would not rely on the current GeorgiaPacific test. Instead, it would base damages on a comparison of the
infringing product to the patent’s specification.
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There are two primary benefits of this reform. First, by calibrating
damages to the contributions made by both the patentee and infringer,
the proposal will allocate incentives in a manner that optimizes all kinds
of innovation. Second, the proposed reform should reduce the cost of
unclear claims. The problem of unclear claims looms largest at outer
edges of a claim’s scope. Because the current reform reduces damages at
these edges, any errors associated with unclear claims are likewise
reduced.
Finally, Part V also describes some exemplary methods for
calculating damages using these principles. The primary example
assesses similarity in two dimensions—how far the infringer has
changed the basic invention and how much the infringer has added to
the basic invention. Other variations are then added to this example to
reflect the different values patent law may wish to highlight. The result
is a flexible framework for balancing innovation incentives.
I. CLAIM SCOPE
Patents are made up of two primary components, the specification
and the claims. The specification is a written description of the
invention. It describes one or more embodiments (i.e., examples) of the
invention and usually includes drawings to help explain the nature of
the invention. The claims follow the specification; they are of
paramount importance because the claims define the scope of the
patented invention. 7 Each claim contains several limitations that define
the claim’s attributes. Anyone who practices all the limitations found in
any claim is said to infringe the patent. 8
Infringement determinations are centered on the patent’s claims
and not its specification. 9 Of course the specification still plays an
important role. It is one of the primary sources of evidence used to
interpret the meaning of the claims. 10 But unlike the claims, the
specification itself is never compared to the accused device. 11 This
7 Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is
axiomatic that the claims mark the outer boundaries of the patent right to exclude.”).
8 See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting that the “‘all limitations’” rule “holds that an accused product or process is not
infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent”).
9 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009) (“In modern American patent doctrine, we
define what the patentee owns not by what she actually built or disclosed, but by what she
claimed.”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719,
731–43 (2009) (describing the evolution of patent law’s claiming system).
10 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
11 SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“Infringement, literal or by equivalence, is determined by comparing an accused product not
with a preferred embodiment described in the specification, or with a commercialized
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arrangement is intended to give the public notice of the scope of the
inventor’s monopoly. 12 Presumably, it is easier to discern the scope of an
invention by examining claims specially prepared to delineate
boundaries as opposed to a description of the invention. 13 However,
relying on claims to define the invention has its problems. Because these
two components are separate, there may be a surprising disconnect
between the specification and the claims. The specification may appear
to describe a narrow invention while the claims are extremely broad.14
Figure 1 below illustrates this point.
The specification typically describes embodiments that fall within
the inner circle, but the claims inevitably read further, as depicted by the
outer circle.
Figure 1

A.

Broad Claims

Patent attorneys draft claims as broadly as they can. In fact, they
often deliberately seek overly broad claims in the hope that the patent

embodiment of the patentee, but with the properly and previously construed claims in suit.”
(citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and
Teledyne McCormick Selph v. United States, 558 F.2d 1000, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1977))).
12 Permutit Co. v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (“[A patent must contain claims
that] inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so
that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and
which may not.”).
13 Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology:
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 502 (2008)
(explaining how the current system of using claims facilitates the public notice function of
patents). But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1783–99; Fromer, supra note 9, at 723
(arguing that the patent system should rely less on claims and more on a system of central
claiming that would use the embodiments described in the specification to determine a patent’s
boundaries).
14 Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
1, 15 (2012) (“[T]he embodiments disclosed in the specification are not the limit of the
allowable subject matter; rather, they form the starting point from which the claim scope
negotiation begins.” (emphasis added)); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 341, 356 (2010) (“[C]ourts and the Patent Office typically allow patent claims that are of
much broader scope than what is actually disclosed in a patent application.”).
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office will accept them. 15 The prior art serves as a check on claim
breadth. 16 Patents are only granted for new inventions. Consequently,
claims that are drafted so expansively that they would cover the prior art
are not patentable. 17 Likewise, trivial claims that would be obvious in
view of the prior art are also unpatentable. 18
But the prior art is not the only restraint on broad claims. An
inventor cannot claim all subject matter that is not found in or
suggested by the prior art. There must be a sufficiently strong
connection between what the inventor describes in the patent’s
specification and what she claims. In practical terms, the question is
whether claims should be limited to the embodiment(s) disclosed in the
specification or whether they can cover variations that were never
described. If the latter choice is selected, the issue becomes how patent
law can restrain the scope of the claims so that they are not unbounded.
The debate over claim breadth can be seen as far back as the
nineteenth century. The famous inventor, Samuel Morse, obtained a
patent containing several claims directed to what we now think of as the
telegraph machine. 19 However, the patent also contained an eighth
claim that was not limited to any specific machinery. Rather it claimed
the use of “electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or
printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances.”20
Morse sued O’Reilly for patent infringement and the case reached the
Supreme Court.
In O’Reilly v. Morse, the majority was understandably concerned
that the eighth claim would prevent future inventors from using an
entirely different mode of writing or printing that was not described in
Morse’s patent. 21 Essentially, the majority did not want the patent to
15 Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603 (2009) (“In practice, clever lawyering can often
produce a patent claim that covers more technological ground than is truly warranted by the
underlying invention.”); Chief Judge Paul Michel, Lecture: Innovation, Incentives, Competition,
and Patent Law Reform: Should Congress Fix the Patent Office and Leave Litigation
Management to the Courts?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1135, 1168 (2010)
(“Let’s be honest. Patent prosecutors are trying to get maximum scope, so they are always
including some claims that are really well beyond what the inventor invented . . . .”).
16 Lemley, supra note 5, at 1001–02 (describing how the novelty and obviousness
requirements limit the ability of inventors to draft broad claims).
17 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
18 Id. § 103. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–22 (2007), for a discussion
of the standard for determining obviousness.
19 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 81–88 (1853).
20 Id. at 86.
21 See id. at 113 (“[S]ome future inventor, in the onward march of science, may discover a
mode of writing or printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without
using any part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His
invention may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expensive in
construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this patent the inventor could not
use it, nor the public have the benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.”).

CHAO.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

1368

4/10/2014 2:21 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1359

cover what Morse did not invent, and the eighth claim was declared
invalid. But the dissent voiced legitimate concerns. It pointed out that
patents should be able to cover simple improvements or changes to their
inventions. 22 The majority agreed saying that a patent can cover
alterations to “unessential parts.” 23 Of course the difficulty is
determining when any modifications are sufficiently substantial that
they cannot be claimed. In Morse’s case, the prevailing view was that the
eighth claim went too far. 24 Courts continue to struggle with similar
problems to this day. How do you determine how far claims may reach
beyond the embodiments found in the specification? In O’Reilly, the
Supreme Court relied on the patent’s disclosure to limit claim breadth,
but the decision did not provide a framework for using the specification
to assess claim breadth.
As discussed in Part II, the idea of using a patent’s disclosure to
assess the validity of a broad claim continues to be found in a number of
current patent doctrines. To one extent or another, the enablement
requirement, written description requirement, and subject matter
patentability doctrine all rely on the patent’s specification to invalidate
unduly broad claims. 25 Similarly, courts also can use the specification to
constrain claim scope by interpreting claims narrowly or finding that
there is no infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents. 26
Notably, these doctrines do not go so far as to limit claims to
embodiments described in the specification. 27 Claims often cover
variations of the invention that are not described in the specification.
In fact, broad claims can even encompass after-arising
technology. 28 Consider one of the patents Apple is asserting against its
22 Id. at 134 (“The claim of the patentee is, that he may be protected in the exercise of his
art as against persons who may improve or change some of the processes or machines necessary
in its exercise.”).
23 Id. at 123 (“It is a well-settled principle of law, that the mere change in the form of the
machinery (unless a particular form is specified as the means by which the effect described is
produced) or an alteration in some of its unessential parts; or in the use of known equivalent
powers, not varying essentially the machine, or its mode of operation or organization, will not
make the new machine a new invention. It may be an improvement upon the former; but that
will not justify its use without the consent of the first patentee.”).
24 Id. at 119–20.
25 See infra Part II.A–B, E.
26 See infra Part II.C–D.
27 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A]lthough
the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly
warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).
28 Collins, supra note 13, at 497 (“A number of high-profile cases expressly sanction the
reach of literal claim scope into [after-arising technology] . . . . The routine phenomenon of
blocking patents—successively issued patents that encompass the same technological thing—
implies that the scope of a patent claim grows over time to encompass technologies that by
definition are not known . . . at the time of filing.”); Lemley, supra note 5, at 1005 (“[P]atent
claims may reach new and unanticipated inventions made after the patent issues, but which fall
within the literal language of the claims.”).
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competitors in the ongoing smart phone patent wars. The invention of
U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 (the ‘647 patent) is related to automatically
marking up types of data in an unstructured document in order to
enable users to bring up other programs that process such data. The
specification of the ‘647 patent disclosed several embodiments (i.e.,
examples) of the invention: recognizing a phone number and calling it
or putting it in an electronic phone book; recognizing an address and
writing a letter or putting the address in an address book; recognizing
an e-mail address and sending an e-mail or putting the e-mail address in
an e-mail address book; recognizing a date and putting it in an
electronic calendar; and recognizing a name and writing a letter, calling
the person, or putting it in a message folder. 29
The invention of the ‘647 patent clearly was intended to operate on
personal computers. 30 The patent was filed almost twenty years ago—
long before any phone had the ability to handle documents and e-mail.31
Not surprisingly, the specification never mentions smart phones.
Nevertheless, Apple successfully argued that HTC’s smart phones
infringed this patent because they recognized phone numbers and
turned them into hyperlinks. Users could then click on the hyperlinks to
dial the phone numbers. 32 Infringement was found even though the
inventors probably did not foresee that their technology would be used
in smart phones. Still, unlike Morse’s eighth claim, the application of
Apple’s ‘647 patent to today’s smart phones probably does not offend
most people’s sense of justice. After all, the accused smart phones were
using technology that looked very similar to what Apple invented.
These examples illustrate how broadly claims can reach. Claims
clearly cover technology that looks precisely like the embodiments
described in the patent. Minor variations may also fall within the scope
of a patent’s claims even though they are not described in the
specification. Finally, claims may also cover after-arising technology
that could not be envisioned at the time the patent was filed. This
happens in two ways. First, claims may cover unforeseen variations of
the invention. For example, photographs are now routinely sent via email. The ‘647 patent might cover a computer that automatically
recognizes the faces in a photo and indexes the photos accordingly. 33
29 U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 fig.4 (filed Feb. 1, 1996) (depicting each of these actions in
Figure 4).
30 Figure 1 depicts the standard personal computer configuration of the time. See ’647
Patent fig.1.
31 The patent was filed on February 1, 1996 and issued on August 31, 1999.
32 See In Re Certain Pers. Data & Mobile Commc’ns Devices & Related Software, Inv. No.
337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331, at 123–35 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Final), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/Pub4331_337-TA-710.pdf.
33 Reasonable minds may differ about whether the ‘647 patent should reach this far. See
infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Second, claims can cover competitors that add something unforeseen to
the invention, like the many features of HTC’s smart phone. These
variations illustrate how the different kinds of infringement lie upon a
continuum. But the point is that as a claim reaches further and further
away from the specification, the law will eventually declare that the
claim goes too far and cannot be enforced. That is what the Supreme
Court concluded with respect to Morse’s eighth claim.
Significant costs are associated with overly broad claims. 34 Broad
claims can lead to underinvestment in technology that builds on
existing patented technology. 35 Additionally, extremely broad claims
offend our notions of fairness because they reward inventors for
something that they did not invent. 36 Samuel Morse’s eighth claim is a
good example of this problem. Few would suggest that Morse deserves a
patent on all electric machines that communicate.
This view stands in sharp contrast to Edmund Kitch’s “prospect
theory.” 37 Prospect theory suggests that patents serve an important
function beyond simply incentivizing innovation. Kitch argued that
broad claims can be desirable because they allow a first mover to
efficiently manage subsequent development and avoid wasteful
duplicative investment. 38
However, I side with the critics of Kitch and reject the supposed
benefits of prospect theory. 39 Prospect theory fails to adequately account
for two real world features of patent law. First, patents do not give their
inventors the exclusive right to practice the fruits of their invention.
Rather, they just give the right to exclude others from practicing the
claimed invention. Multiple patents are typically needed to make most
products, and ownership of those patents is often divided. Thus,
granting broad claims does not give any one company the ability to

Of course there are often disputes about whether claims are overly broad.
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 (1990) (“Property rights that are too narrow will not provide enough
incentive to develop the asset, while overly broad rights will preempt too many competitive
development efforts.”); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991) (“[S]uch broad protection can lead
to deficient incentives to develop second generation products.”).
36 See Liivak, supra note 14, at 26–30 (criticizing the current law for allowing patents to
claim more than the actual invention).
37 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 267 (1977).
38 Id. at 276, 278–79.
39 See, e.g., Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 203 (1980) (“[P]rospect features [in a patents system]
fail to assist market participants in their attempt to economize on the common property
resource.”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 872 (suggesting that Kitch’s theory may make
sense in principle, but not in practice).
34
35
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coordinate further development. 40 Second, prospect theory
overestimates what companies know about each other’s patents. Most
companies do not look for or know about the existence of patents that
may affect them. 41 Furthermore, many patent holders now deliberately
lie-in-wait to assert their patents so that they can “holdup” the accused
infringers. 42 Because of the failure of patent law’s notice function,
patents do not avoid duplicative efforts. Of course these characteristics
primarily describe the high-tech industry where thousands of patented
inventions can be found in a single product. 43
Thus, this Article starts with the proposition that overly broad
claims, particularly in the high-tech industry, are a problem that needs
to be addressed. But the law also needs to be careful not to narrow
claims too far. Issuing very narrow claims has its problems too. If claims
were limited to the embodiment disclosed in the specification, others
could make minor changes to the invention and avoid infringement. 44
That would devalue patents and under incentivize all inventors. For
years the courts have struggled to balance these concerns and limit
claim breadth appropriately. In effect, patent law needs to constrain
claim scope so that it does not depart too far from the specification (as
shown in the left of Figure 2) without limiting claims to the described
embodiments and their most trivial variations (as shown in the right of
Figure 2).
40 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442
(2004) (“[T]he holder of a broad prospect patent covering an entire field of technology cannot
stop another inventor from searching for, and patenting, improvements to the technology.”).
Duffy does suggest that early prospect patents may have different benefits than Kitch identified.
They channel rivalry so that patents expire earlier and thereby diminish monopoly rents. Id. at
444.
41 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 80–81 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter FTC, THE EVOLVING IP
MARKETPLACE], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolvingip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307
patentreport.pdf (explaining how the notice function of patents appears to work in the
pharmaceutical industry but fails in the information technology industry); Mark A. Lemley,
Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (“[B]oth researchers and companies in
component industries simply ignore patents.”).
42 FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 41, at 52–53 (explaining how ex post
transactions overcompensate patent holders and thereby harm competition).
43 But if we look at industries with products that are covered by a small number of patents
(e.g., the pharmaceutical industry), it is unclear that there is much follow-on innovation to
manage. To be fair, broad patent rights in the pharmaceutical industry would probably deter
others from pursuing duplicative research.
44 See Collins, supra note 13, at 496; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (“[C]ourts have . . . recognized that to permit imitation of a
patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection
of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.”); Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc.,
429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (suggesting that if patents were limited to the
embodiments they disclosed, the patents “would rapidly become worthless as new modes of
practicing the invention developed, and the inventor would lose the benefit of the patent
bargain”).
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Figure 2

Broad
Claims

Narrow
Claims

Specification

Specification
B.

Unclear Claims

The problem of intentionally broad claims is compounded by the
existence of unclear claims. Interpreting claims is not easy. Describing
the boundaries of an invention is far more difficult than describing the
boundaries of real property. After all, real property boundaries can use
objective measurements while claims try to capture the essence of an
invention with language. 45 This problem is made worse by attorneys.
Now you might think that good attorneys would try to avoid drafting
unclear claims. 46 Unfortunately, attorneys are incentivized to do just the
opposite. I have heard more than once that patent attorneys should draft
claims to give their client maximum flexibility. That means drafting
claims that are intentionally vague. 47
Another feature of the law that makes patent claims even less
certain is claim interpretation or claim construction. Claim
interpretation is a process whereby courts provide definitions for key

45 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 55 (2008) (“[I]t is much more complicated to map the

boundaries of a technology from a verbal description than it is to map a plot of land using a
standardized surveyor’s description.”).
46 See, e.g., Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1737, 1810 (2011) (arguing that patentees should be required to include explicit
definitions of claim terms).
47 Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1753 (“[M]any applicants don’t specify what they mean
by ambiguous technical language, either because they don’t think about the issue or because
they intend to exploit the ambiguity in obtaining or enforcing the patent.”).
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phrases and words from the claims of the patent. 48 Ideally, the
definitions or “claim constructions” clarify the meaning of the claims in
a manner that helps resolve the dispute. 49 Almost every patent case
involves a dispute over the meaning of the claims. 50 Indeed, local patent
rules often recommend that courts conduct a hearing specifically to
interpret claims. 51
In 2005, an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit attempted to set
forth a methodology that would make claim interpretation more
predictable. 52 The Phillips v. AWH Corp. decision valued intrinsic
evidence (e.g., the claims, specification, and prosecution history) over
extrinsic evidence (e.g., dictionaries and expert testimony). 53
Consequently, claims are now supposed to be interpreted primarily
based on context (i.e., how the inventor used the terms); the plain
meaning of a term is relevant, but given less weight. 54 Despite the
Phillips decision, courts (including the Federal Circuit itself) either will
not or cannot apply these principles consistently across different cases. 55
Given the difficulties with claim construction, it is not surprising
that outcomes continue to be very unpredictable. There is a high claim
construction reversal rate. In a study of Federal Circuit decisions, David
Schwartz has found that “38.2% of cases had at least one term wrongly
construed.” 56 “Moreover, 29.7% of the cases had to be reversed, vacated,
and/or remanded because of an erroneous claim construction.” 57 Since
Schwartz’s study, Jonas Anderson and Peter Menell have reported that
reversal rates have decreased with around 29.5% of Federal Circuit
decisions reversing at least one term. 58 This corresponded to a remand,
reversal, or vacation in 23.1% of cases. 59 However, they do not attribute
this improvement to increased clarity in the law. Rather, they suggest
48 Since claim interpretation is a legal issue, the courts must perform this task. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).
49 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim
language: in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.”),
overruled on other grounds by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
50 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1744.
51 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 4-1 to 4-7 (2009) (section titled “Claim Construction
Proceedings”), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/localrules/patent.
52 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
53 Id. at 1314–19.
54 Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1868
(2012) (describing Phillips as a “specification-influenced claim interpretation methodology” as
opposed to one relying on dictionaries).
55 See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
56 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 248.
57 Id. at 249.
58 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 39 (2014).
59 Id.
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that the Federal Circuit has been applying a level of unstated deference
to district court claim construction rulings. 60 If Anderson and Menell
are correct, parties are not much better off. They still will be unable to
predict district court rulings with reasonable certainty. Figure 3 below
depicts the uncertain scope of the patents. The area depicted in grey
reflects the unknown. Until a patent is litigated, it is unclear whether
this subject matter is covered by a patent’s claims.
Figure 3

This uncertainty burdens innovation in several ways. When claim
scope is uncertain, there is always the possibility that the claim will be
interpreted too broadly. In other words, competitors do not just have to
worry about stepping inside the boundaries protected by a patent’s
claims; they must worry about stepping near those boundaries too. 61 As
a result, companies may end up foregoing technology that is not actually
covered by a patent. In these cases, no one wins. The company does not
get to use its preferred technology. The patentee does not receive any
royalties. More importantly, society loses too. A company’s decision to
forego technology will likely cause its product to become less desirable
or more expensive.
Alternatively, uncertainty may cause companies to take licenses for
patents that they do not need. This result is problematic too. These costs
unnecessarily burden innovation. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have
argued that uncertainty even contributes to systematic overcompensation in the patent system. 62 They created an economic model
Id. at 52.
FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 41, at 78 (“When patents provide
poor notice of their scope, the resulting uncertainty may force a firm to incur these costs
unnecessarily for patents that would not be held to cover their product, burdening innovative
activities and raising prices.”).
62 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 2017–25 (2007).
60
61
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that calculates what royalty rates parties will negotiate. The model used
the term “patent strength” to represent the likelihood that a patent was
valid and infringed. 63 Lemley and Shapiro concluded that in some
scenarios the negotiated royalty rate “does not involve any discounting
based on patent strength.” 64 In other words, competitors often assume
that patents will be interpreted broadly and do not discount for the
possibility that the patent will be given a narrower construction or be
found to be invalid. Especially for weak patents (i.e., narrow or invalid
patents), this results in systematic overcompensation. 65
Uncertainty also increases transaction costs. Simply trying to assess
the boundaries of a patent before litigation is expensive. 66 When
companies roll the dice and let the courts tell them if the technology
they are using is covered by another’s patent, the price is even higher. 67
Moreover, by the time a company even learns about a patent, there may
already be significant sunk costs. Retooling a product to avoid future
infringement often costs far more than designing a non-infringing
product in the first instance.
This Article tries to address the problems caused by overbroad and
unclear claims. But the proposal does not try to fix the doctrines that
limit claims and make them more predictable. Instead it assumes that
substantial uncertainty surrounding these doctrines is inevitable.
Indeed, each of the different claim-limiting doctrines can be thought to
produce a probability distribution. The closer the subject matter is to
what the patent describes, the more likely the claim is either infringed or
valid. In Part II, this Article describes each of these different doctrines
and illustrates how unpredictable they are.

Id. at 1996–97.
Id. at 2004.
65 Id. at 1993. Thus, Lemley and Shapiro suggest that patent holders actually benefit from
uncertainty. But uncertainty can also cost patent holders. When patent rights are uncertain,
some companies will undoubtedly escape liability even when they should be found liable for
infringement.
66 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 45, at 55 (“[A] legal ‘opinion letter’ on a technology
typically costs about . . . $20,000 to $100,000[].”); FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra
note 41, at 77 (“[W]hen the notice function is poorly served, the costs of identifying and
analyzing relevant patents can be onerous.”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 28 (2013), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf (“[U]ncertainty of a patent’s scope . . . usually needs
to be resolved in court . . . .”).
67 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 45, at 70 (“The cost of clearance ratchets up even more
when patents have fuzzy boundaries . . . .”).
63
64
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II. TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Modern patent law has traditionally looked to the enablement
requirement and claim interpretation to reign in claims that depart too
far from the specification. More recently, the written description
requirement has also been used to tap down on overly broad claims.
Some commentators have suggested that subject matter patentability
and the reverse doctrine of equivalents should also be used to curb
broad claims. This section reviews each of these doctrines. To varying
degrees of effectiveness, these doctrines all provide some limits on broad
claiming. But these doctrines are relatively crude. The results are always
binary; most of these doctrines result in a claim being found valid or
invalid. 68 In the case of claim construction and the reverse doctrine of
equivalents, the outcome is infringement or non-infringement. But the
effect is the same; there is a winner or a loser with no middle ground.
This problem is exacerbated by the complexity of these doctrines.
Consequently, parties cannot predict whether they will win or lose.
A.

Enablement

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the specification of a patent must describe
“the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use . . . the invention.” 69 This requirement is satisfied when a
person of ordinary skill in the art, after reading the specification, could
practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation. 70 The
enablement requirement serves two functions. 71 First, it requires the
inventor to inform the public how to practice the invention. Second,
and more importantly for purposes of the current analysis, it serves to
constrain the permissible scope of claims. 72
Historically, the enablement doctrine has primarily limited broad
claims in the so-called unpredictable arts (e.g., chemicals and the life

68 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 883
(2010) (noting that the patent law’s binary inquiries are not “optimal instrument[s]” for
making policy).
69 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
70 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(“Enablement . . . is not precluded even if some experimentation is necessary, although the
amount of experimentation needed must not be unduly extensive . . . .”).
71 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 87 (2d ed. 2011).
72 Id.
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sciences). 73 For example, claims directed at “all possible genetic
sequences that have EPO-like activity” were found not to be enabled
when the specification only disclosed how to make one gene and a
handful of analogs. 74 Similarly, a claim directed toward a vaccine on all
pathogenic RNA viruses was invalidated when the specification only
disclosed a vaccine that conferred immunity in chickens against one
type of RNA tumor virus. 75
But enablement law is both confusing and badly fractured. To
determine whether a broad claim in the unpredictable arts is properly
enabled, the eight Wands factors must be considered. 76 Of course, an
eight-factor test is not conducive to yielding consistent results. To make
matters worse, the Federal Circuit cannot agree on how to handle
patents in the predictable arts (e.g., mechanical and electrical
technology). Earlier decisions applied a simple rule. They suggest that a
claim in the predictable arts is enabled when the specification describes
a single embodiment that falls within the scope of that claim. 77 While
the “single embodiment rule” is easy to apply, it does little to curb broad
claims because the boundaries of the claim can be quite distant from the
single embodiment described by the specification. 78
Several recent decisions in the predictable arts have ignored the
single embodiment rule and applied the new “full scope rule.” 79 Under
the full scope rule, every embodiment that falls within the scope of the
73 See Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV.
127, 137 (2008) (“[T]he judiciary has required more detailed disclosure in chemistry and the
experimental sciences.”); see, e.g., In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“In cases
involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, the
scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors
involved.”).
74 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1560–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
76 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The factors are:

(1) [T]he quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature
of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art,
(7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
Id.

77 See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“If an
invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g., mechanical as opposed to
chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment . . . .”); see
also Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (even
applying the single embodiment rule in the unpredictable arts); Engel Indus. v. Lockformer Co.,
946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 527 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
78 This Article adopts the nomenclature from my previous article on enablement. See
Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule, 2009
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 56, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinkingenablement.pdf (discussing the different enablement standards applied by the Federal Circuit).
79 See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Auto. Techs. Int’l,
Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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claim must be enabled. For example, in Automotive Technologies
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., the Federal Circuit
found that claims that generally encompassed both electronic and
mechanical side impact sensors were not enabled when the specification
described the mechanical sensors in detail but only provided a
conceptual diagram of an electronic sensor. 80 Although the “full scope”
rule is clearly designed to address overly broad claims, it is unworkable.
There is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls within a claim. 81 In
many cases, that embodiment will not be enabled. But a claim should
not be invalidated simply because the inventor did not foresee every
embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope.
Currently, there are four different conflicting enablement
standards that have support in Federal Circuit case law: the Wands
factors, the single embodiment rule, the full scope rule, and a blended
rule that depends on whether the patent is in the predictable or
unpredictable arts. 82 This state of affairs has been described as “doctrinal
chaos.” 83 Parties have little sense of what the enablement doctrine would
permit a claim to reach. 84 Enablement’s unpredictability is aggravated
by the fact that there can be only two outcomes. A claim is either valid
or invalid. 85 The result is a system of winners and losers.
B.

Written Description

The written description requirement has recently emerged as
another potential tool to reign in overly broad claims. 86 Like the
enablement requirement, the written description requirement is rooted
in 35 U.S.C § 112. The relevant passage says that “[t]he specification
Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285.
Chao, supra note 78, at 89 (“[T]he full scope rule allows defendants to identify any
embodiment and try to prove that the patent does not enable it.”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141,
1175 (2008) (“Due to the infinite scope of patent claims, a patentee certainly need not, and in
most instances cannot, enable every embodiment falling within the ‘full scope’ of the claims.”).
82 See Chao, supra note 78, at 50–55 (describing the different standards).
83 Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1085–89
(2009).
84 Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 537–38 (2010) (noting
that this problem also exists with respect to the written description doctrine discussed in the
following section).
85 But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 157–60
(2006) (arguing that enablement principles should be used to interpret claims and thereby curb
unduly broad claims). Although Holbrook would use enablement principles to narrow the
scope of the claim, this proposal also still only has two results—a finding of infringement or
non-infringement.
86 Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Patent and Trademark Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 313, 320 (2012) (“The written description requirement acts as a safeguard against
overbroad claims.”).
80
81
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shall contain a written description of the invention.” 87 Until recently, it
was unclear whether this doctrine required the specification to provide
any disclosure beyond what was already required to enable the claimed
invention. 88 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., an en banc
panel of the Federal Circuit answered that question by stating that the
written description and enablement requirements were separate and
distinct. 89 To satisfy the written description requirement, the
specification “must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to
recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” 90 Ariad went on
to explain that this requirement “ensures that when a patent claims a
genus by its function or result, the specification recites sufficient
materials to accomplish that function.” 91 In other words, the written
description requirement guards against claims that depart too far from
the invention actually found in the specification.
There are two notable differences between the written description
and enablement requirements. First, the enablement requirement
assesses whether the specification adequately teaches others while the
written description requirement assesses whether the specification
demonstrates that the patentee was in possession of his invention at the
time the application was filed. 92 Thus, the two requirements are
evaluated from slightly different perspectives. Second, enablement is a
question of law with underlying factual issues 93 and the written
description is a question of fact. 94 Courts will decide whether a claim is
valid under the enablement requirement while juries will decide if the
claim satisfies the written description requirement.
Despite these differences, there are serious doubts whether the
written description requirement will provide any significant new
limitations on broad claims. 95 Even if the requirements are distinct, the
35 U.S.C § 112(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The issue of whether patent
law contains a separate written description requirement has percolated through various panels
of this court, on a variety of facts.”).
89 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The
written description requirement has traditionally been used to prevent the late claiming of new
matter (i.e., to prevent patent applicants from adding new inventions to an older disclosure).
The question in Ariad was whether the requirement also applied to originally filed claims.
90 Id. at 1351 (alteration in original) (quoting Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91 Id. at 1352.
92 See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asking whether the
application “reasonably convey[s] to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed
the []claimed subject matter at the time the [patent] application was filed”).
93 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
94 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
95 Numerous judges argued that a separate written description requirement was not
justified on policy grounds. See id. at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); id. at 1372 (Rader & Linn,
JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
87
88
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enablement defense already guards against overly broad claims in much
the same way that the written description requirement does. They both
measure the breadth of the claims against the specification, albeit with
slightly different perspectives in mind. Studies also suggest that a
separate written description requirement will not have much effect.
Dennis Crouch reviewed Board of Patent Appeals and Interference
patent opinions and “found that none of the outcomes of those
decisions would have been impacted by a legal change that entirely
eliminated the written description requirement of § 112.” 96 Earlier,
Chris Holman came to the same conclusion in a study of both federal
courts and PTO decisions. 97 Holman only identified nine original claims
that were rejected for lacking written description and concluded that
each of those rejected claims was, or “could have easily been,” held
invalid for lacking enablement. 98 The Ariad court was aware of these
studies and admitted that the enablement and written description
requirements “often rise and fall together.”99
Thus, it seems unlikely that the written description requirement
will reign in broad claims beyond what the enablement requirement
already has. What is more, there is no reason to believe that the written
description will be any easier to apply than the enablement
requirement. 100 Thus, like enablement, the binary outcomes will result
in big winners and losers.
C.

Claim Interpretation

Claim interpretation can also safeguard against overly broad
claims. 101 Defendants typically ask courts to adopt a narrow claim
interpretation that closely tracks the embodiments disclosed in the
specification. By interpreting claims in light of the specification,
defendants are able to find support for these narrow interpretations. 102
In response, patentees point out that claims are not limited to the
96 Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in
Patent Examination, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2010). This conclusion assumed that the
Patent Office would still “reject claims based on the addition of ‘new matter.’” Id.
97 Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 1, 78 (2007).
98 Id. at 71.
99 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
100 See Chiang, supra note 84.
101 See Stephen McJohn, Scary Patents, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 343, 367 (2009).
102 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (“[I]t is fundamental that claims are to be construed in
the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention.”
(citations omitted)).
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preferred embodiments and a broader interpretation is warranted. 103
Since both principles are well supported in the law, judges can justify a
broader or narrower interpretation by simply relying on the appropriate
principle. Indeed, this “classic” claim construction dispute occurs all the
time. Decisions repeatedly discuss the fine line between impermissibly
importing limitations from the specification and appropriately
interpreting a claim in light of the specification. 104
This problem was recently highlighted in Retractable Technologies,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. 105 The patent at issue related to medical
syringes that contained a needle that retracted into the syringe body
after use and thereby lowered the risk of later accidental needle sticks.
The disputed claim term was “body.” The defendant argued that “body”
was limited to a one-piece structure, but the district court rejected that
view. 106 The defendant appealed this ruling to the Federal Circuit.
Writing for the majority, Judge Lourie focused on the fact that the
specification only disclosed one-piece structure syringe bodies and
distinguished prior syringes that were made of multiple pieces. By
interpreting the claims in light of the specification, the majority was able
to conclude that the term “body” was limited to a single-piece
structure. 107
Chief Judge Rader dissented. He argued that the plain meaning of
body is not limited to a single-piece structure. 108 Chief Judge Rader also
pointed out that some of the patent’s other claims specifically limited
the body to a one-piece barrel. These claims suggested that, by itself,
body was not limited to a single-piece structure. 109 Finally, unlike the
103 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[C]laims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is
illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification.’” (quoting Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc.
v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); see, e.g., Comaper Corp. v.
Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (refusing to limit the term “case” to the sole
embodiment of an “enclosed” case in the specification).
104 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[W]e recognize that the distinction between using the
specification to interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations from the
specification into the claim can be a difficult one to apply in practice.”); Comark Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is sometimes a fine line
between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim
from the specification.”).
105 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Retractable I), 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
106 See id. at 1304.
107 Id. at 1304–05.
108 Id. at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part).
109 Id. at 1311–13. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, “the presence of a dependent
claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in
question is not present in the independent claim.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. But see DigitalVending Servs. Int’l, LLC v. Univ. of Phx., Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine of claim differentiation does not serve to broaden claims beyond
their meaning . . . in light of the specification.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Toro Co. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
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majority, Chief Judge Rader found nothing in the specification that
contradicted the broad, plain meaning of body. Consequently, he
concluded that the majority was improperly importing limitations from
the specification. 110 The patentee filed a petition to have the entire
Federal Circuit rehear the issue. Although the petition was rejected,
Judge Moore joined Chief Judge Rader in dissent arguing that the
majority’s opinion impermissibly changed the plain meaning of “body”
to tailor the scope of the patent to what the panel believes was the
“actual invention.”111 In the end, two Federal Circuit judges concluded
that “body” was limited to a single-piece structure and two others
concluded that it could encompass multiple pieces. Retractable
Technologies illustrates how judges that regularly construe claims can
select different rules to justify different claim scope. Unfortunately, this
kind of dispute happens regularly in patent law. 112
Judges do not just struggle with claim breadth. There are many
other doctrines that make claims construction unpredictable.
Determining the meaning of patent claims requires a judge to break the
text of a claim into discrete “elements.” But it is unclear how to
determine what part of a claim is an element. 113 Moreover, the scope of a
claim can change over time. 114 Finally, there is the problem of
“metaconstruction.” 115 Even after courts interpret a claim, parties often
fight over the meaning of the courts’ new definitions. 116 Consequently,
parties do not know how far a given patent’s claims extend. Moreover,
like every doctrine discussed here, there are binary outcomes. While
other doctrines lead to findings of validity or invalidity, a claim
construction decision generally results in findings of infringement or
non-infringement.

Retractable I, 653 F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting in part).
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Retractable II), 659 F.3d 1369, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
112 See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV
1097, 1109 (2011) (“Contradictory doctrine makes claim construction outcomes difficult to
predict without litigation, and judicial disagreement frequently arises when such issues are
litigated.”); Cotropia, supra note 54, at 1870 (“Opinions after Phillips switch between
methodologies; some rely mainly on the claim language’s plain meaning whereas others depend
heavily on the specification’s text and drawings.”).
113 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
29, 31 (2005) (“[T]here are no hard and fast standards in the law by which to make the ‘right’
decision as to either the size of the textual element or the level of abstraction at which the
element will be evaluated.”).
114 See Collins, supra note 13, at 510 (explaining how claims regularly expand to cover after
arising technology).
115 Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1760.
116 Id.
110
111
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Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents

Theoretically, the reverse doctrine of equivalents could operate as
some form of check on overly broad claims. The reverse doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable doctrine designed “to prevent unwarranted
extension of the claims beyond a fair scope of the patentee’s
invention.”117 The Supreme Court has said that it applies “where a
device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it
performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way,
but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim.” 118
Yet, the reverse doctrine of equivalents is disfavored by the courts.
In fact, in Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources,
Inc., the Federal Circuit declared that the doctrine did not survive the
Patent Act of 1952. 119 Tate Access overstates the demise of the reverse
doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine is rarely seen in practice. 120 But
there are Federal Circuit decisions that have considered the reverse
doctrine of equivalents since 1952 121 and commentators have labeled
Tate Access’s pronouncement regarding the doctrine as dicta. 122 The
reverse doctrine of equivalents has far greater respect in the academic
community. Numerous commentators have mentioned its importance

117 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1991), overruled on other grounds by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (en banc).
118 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950).
119 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the
reverse doctrine of equivalents. And with good reason: when Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112,
after the decision in Graver Tank, it imposed requirements for the written description,
enablement, definiteness, and means-plus-function claims that are co-extensive with the
broadest possible reach of the reverse doctrine of equivalents.”). But see Scripps, 927 F.2d at
1581 (finding a factual issue with respect to the reverse doctrine of equivalents and reversing
summary judgment of infringement).
120 Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The reverse
doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of noninfringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents.” (citing Tate Access, 279 F.3d at 1368)).
121 See, e.g., DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (finding that defendant should not be sanctioned for raising a reverse doctrine of
equivalents defense); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (considering but rejecting the defendant’s reverse doctrine of equivalents defense on
the merits); Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1581.
122 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1174 n.122.
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and called for its use. 123 To date, the courts have not responded to those
calls. 124
But even if the reverse doctrine of equivalents were to be revived, it
also yields only two outcomes. Either the patentee wins and there is
infringement, or the accused infringer wins and there is none. The
current law does not reduce the remedy simply because there was a
good, albeit losing, reverse doctrine of equivalents defense.
E.

Subject Matter Patentability

Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject
matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”125
Although the legislative history of the Patent Act suggested that
“anything under the sun that is made by man” is patent eligible, 126 the
courts have created exceptions. 127 “[L]aws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not eligible to be patented. 128
Surprisingly, the issue of claim scope has emerged as an important
factor in determining when claims cover one of these unpatentable
concepts.
An invention is not unpatentable simply because it includes an
unpatentable concept. 129 “[A]n application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.” 130 Just in 2012, in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., the Supreme Court suggested
that when a claim adds “enough” to an unpatentable concept to change
it into an application, the claim is patent eligible. 131 Unfortunately, the

123 See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 128 (2009); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 118‒19 (2004); Holbrook, supra note 5, at 12–15; Lemley,
supra note 5, at 1010–13; Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 856–66.
124 Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 399 n.82
(2012) (“Parties in fourteen appeals raised the reverse doctrine of equivalents between 2001 and
2010.”).
125 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
126 S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
127 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
128 Id.; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (saying that a mathematical
expression is simply a “scientific truth” and unpatentable).
129 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
130 Id. (emphasis omitted).
131 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012)
(framing the issue in Mayo as whether “the patent claims add enough to their statements of the
[natural law] to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that
apply natural laws”).
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Mayo decision did not provide a framework that explains how to
determine what enough is. 132
Instead, the Supreme Court simply gave a few examples of what
was not enough to render a claim patentable. For example, Mayo said
that overly broad claims that do no more than “apply the algorithm” are
unpatentable. 133 Previous decisions had already warned that a claim
cannot preempt all the applications of a law of nature, physical
phenomenon, or abstract idea. 134 If assessing subject matter
patentability were as simple as just examining claim breadth, the
doctrine would probably become more certain. Mark Lemley, Michael
Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R. Polk Wagner proposed precisely this kind
of framework in 2011. 135 But in Mayo, the Supreme Court already
appears to have rejected their proposal. 136
Instead the Court looked at many different factors without
explaining how they fit together. First, the Supreme Court found that
adding three types of limitations do not make an unpatentable concept
patentable: “(1) limiting an unpatentable concept to a particular
audience, (2) telling someone about the concept, or (3) adding a
conventional or obvious [pre-solution] activity.” 137 The decision also
compared the invention in Mayo to the inventions in Parker v. Flook 138
and Diamond v. Diehr, 139 earlier Supreme Court cases on patentable
subject matter. Without any real explanation, Mayo concluded that the
invention at issue was closer to Flook and therefore unpatentable. 140 But
the patents in these two cases appear to cover very similar inventions
making it even more difficult to understand how to apply the law of
subject matter patentability. 141
132 See Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012) (critiquing Mayo
and proposing a framework for determining when additional limitations render an
unpatentable concept patent eligible); Michael Risch, Patentable Subject Matter, the Supreme
Court, and Me, MADISONIAN.NET (Mar. 20, 2012), http://madisonian.net/2012/03/20/
patentable-subject-matter-the-supreme-court-and-me (complaining about how difficult it will
be to determine what detail needs to be added).
133 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301–02 (characterizing both the claims in Mayo and Benson, 409
U.S. at 71, as overly broad).
134 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853).
135 See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1339–41 (2011) (proposing that subject matter patentability should
be recast as a five-factor test for overclaiming).
136 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 135,
and responding that “our cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature
according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow”).
137 Chao, supra, note 132, at 429.
138 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
139 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
140 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299–300.
141 See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 349 (2007)
(“Flook and Diehr are difficult to reconcile.”); Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud:
The Future of Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 590 (2011) (noting
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Compounding the confusion, before Mayo, the belief was that the
machine-or-transformation test was the primary mechanism for
determining subject matter patentability. 142 Under this test, a process
was only patentable if it was tied to a particular machine or transformed
an article to another state. Of course there were problems with this test.
For example, it was unclear whether the test applied exclusively to
process patents. 143 Moreover, no one knows what types of computers, if
any, can qualify as a “specific machine.” 144 The Supreme Court muddied
the waters even further when the Mayo decision appeared to diminish
the test’s importance. 145
Simply put, subject matter patentability has never been more
uncertain than after Mayo. Many patents in the biotechnology, medical
diagnostics, and software industries have an unpatentable concept at
their core. But after Mayo, it is unclear whether these patents have
added “enough” to the claims to render them patent eligible. 146 The
Supreme Court recently attempted to provide some clarity for the
biotechnology industry in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. 147 Relying on the rule against patenting “naturally
occurring things,” the Court held that claims drawn to isolated genomic
DNA did not cover patent eligible subject matter. 148 However, the Court
distinguished claims drawn to complementary DNA (cDNA) because
cDNA is not naturally occurring. 149 Thus, after Myriad, isolated DNA
claims are not patent-eligible but cDNA claims are. But the analysis
underlying these two results is still unclear. After all, isolated genomic
DNA does not actually occur in nature. Chemical bonds must first be
severed. Thus, Myriad suggests that some structural differences are

that Diehr and Flook had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Mark A. Lemley, Point of
Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2011) (characterizing the claims in Diehr and Flook as
“almost exactly parallel”).
142 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (stating that “the machine-ortransformation test is a useful and important clue [or] investigative tool,” but it “is not the sole
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’” under § 101); Chao, supra
note 132, at 427 (“Unfortunately, the Court did not identify other tests that should be used, and
the lower courts continue to rely on the machine-or-transformation test while rotely noting
that it is not the only test.”).
143 See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 135, at 1322–23 (discussing the
ambiguities in the machine-or-transformation test).
144 See id.
145 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (“[I]n stating that the ‘machine-or-transformation’ test is an
‘important and useful clue’ to patentability, we have neither said nor implied that the test
trumps the ‘law of nature’ exclusion.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225–
27)).
146 See Chao, supra note 132, at 432; Risch, supra note 132.
147 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
148 Id. at 2116–20.
149 Id. at 2119. cDNA is a synthetically created exons-only molecule.
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sufficient to establish patent eligibility while others are not. 150 How
much is unclear. Christopher Holman identifies a number of
technologies that fall within this netherworld. 151
The question of whether and what software is patent eligible is even
more confusing. In 2013, the Federal Circuit attempted to address
whether adding computer limitations to an otherwise unpatentable
concept could render software patents eligible. 152 Unfortunately, the
judges could not find common ground and the decision contained seven
separate opinions reflecting at least three distinct approaches. 153 Just
recently, the Supreme Court has agreed to take up CLS Bank
International v. Alice Corp. 154 Hopefully, the Court will provide clearer
guidance. Thus, some of the most fundamental questions of patent
eligibility are now in a state of flux. Although the courts are trying to
provide greater clarity to the doctrine, so far they have failed. For now,
subject matter patentability remains part of the large list of patent law
doctrines that are difficult to apply and have only two outcomes, valid
or invalid.
F.

Flaws with the Current Approaches

The problem with the current approaches to overly broad claims is
that they do not account for the different types of infringement that
exist. These doctrines only allow for two outcomes. The claim either can
or cannot reach particular subject matter that departs from the patent’s
specification. In the former case, the claim is infringed and valid. In the
latter case, the claim is either not infringed and/or invalid. These results
would make sense if infringement also came in only two flavors. But in
reality, there are many different types of potential infringement. These
different types can be thought to fall along an infringement continuum.
The infringement continuum is simply a reflection of claim
breadth. 155 Returning to Apple’s ‘647 patent, the different examples of
150 Christopher M. Holman, In Myriad the Supreme Court Has, Once Again, Increased the
Uncertainty of U.S. Patent Law, 32 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 289, 291–92 (2013) (discussing the
implicit requirement of significant structural change). But see Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at
the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 111, 112–15 (2013) (discussing
how both Mayo and Myriad could be interpreted as focusing more explicitly on innovation).
151 Holman, supra note 150, at 292–93 (Holman questions whether “a DNA-based gene
therapy vector based on a naturally occurring DNA sequence” or “monoclonal antibody-based
drugs” are now patent eligible).
152 See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. granted
134 S. Ct. 734, 735 (2013).
153 See Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1217 (2013) (discussing CLS Bank and critically reviewing the different tests for
determining whether software patents are eligible under § 101).
154 CLS Bank Int’l, 717 F.3d 1269.
155 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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claim breadth can be recast as different points along an infringement
continuum. An infringing product can look precisely like the
embodiments described in the patent. In the case of the ‘647 patent, a
personal computer that recognizes a phone number and allows the user
to automatically dial the number plainly infringes the patent. 156 An
infringing product may also be a minor variation of the disclosed
embodiment. For example, a personal computer that appends the
number one before dialing an out of area number would almost
certainly infringe the patent. This is true even though the specification
never mentioned prepending the number one. However, some
infringements may also look like something totally different and
unexpected. Smart phones may add unforeseen technology yet infringe
the patent. Kevin Collins classifies this kind of after-arising technology
as a “complement” because consumers desire both the original property
(i.e., recognizing a phone number, calling it, and putting it in an
electronic phone book) and the new property (i.e., the new smart phone
features). 157 Alternatively, the ‘647 patent may cover unforeseen
variations like computers that recognize faces in photographs and index
the photographs accordingly. Collins characterizes technology with this
property as a “substitute” because it replaces the original property
disclosed in the patent. 158
Thus, the infringement continuum can be thought of as extending
in two different dimensions. Along one dimension, new technology may
change the fundamental nature of the invention. Nonetheless, this new
technology may still fall within the scope of the patent’s claims. Along
the second dimension, new technology may arise in ways that are not
central to the heart of the invention. 159 Likewise, this technology may
also fall within the scope of the patent’s claims. This Article uses Collin’s
“substitutionary” and “complementary” terminology to describe these
two dimensions of the infringement continuum.
156

Claim 15 of the ‘647 patent is probably the simplest and broadest claim. It recites:

In a computer having a memory storing actions, a method for causing the computer
to perform an action on a structure identified in computer data, comprising the steps
of: receiving computer data; detecting a structure in the data; linking at least one
action to the detected structure; enabling selection of the structure and a linked
action; and executing the selected action linked to the selected structure.
U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 col. 8 l. 22–33 (filed Feb. 1, 1996).
157 Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking to
Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1296–97 (2011).
158 Id.
159 This analysis assumes that claims have a “point of novelty,” a proposition that is not
uncontroversial. For a discussion explaining why not all claim limitations should be treated
equally, see generally Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing That
Inventions Have Heart, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010) and Lemley,
supra note 141.
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Now many of us may disagree on the proper scope of the ‘647
patent. Some may suggest that the claims cannot be interpreted to cover
smart phones or facial recognition technology. 160 Others would suggest
claims that reach that far afield from the specification must fail the
enablement and written description requirements. One might even
argue that interpreting the ‘647 patent renders the claim unpatentable
because it covers an abstract idea—the concept of recognizing
unformatted data. On the other hand, there are reasonable arguments
that the ‘647 patent covers each of the examples described above.
But even if reasonable minds cannot agree on proper claim scope,
they should be able to agree that some of these infringements should be
treated differently than others. A company that does precisely what is
described in the specification owes a greater debt to the patentee than a
company that modifies the invention in some unforeseen ways or adds
its own contributions. Relying on this insight, this Article offers a
different framework that ties disclosure principles to the remedies
patent law provides. The details of earlier proposals and my proposal
follow.
III. EXISTING PROPOSALS
My proposal builds on two existing concepts found in the academic
literature. First, several commentators have argued that the standard for
determining whether to grant permanent injunctions should consider
significant differences between the infringement and the patented
invention. The effect would be to base part of a patentee’s remedy on the
proximity of the infringement to the patented invention. However, these
proposals do not allow for much fine tuning because decisions
regarding permanent injunctions typically result in one of two
outcomes, a simple denial or grant. 161 Second, a different set of
commentators have suggested that patent law return to a system of
“central claiming” whereby infringement determinations are made by
relying on the patent’s specification, and not its claims. In the following
two sections, I describe these proposals and their potential benefits. I
then explain why my own proposal improves on the suggestions to
160 Collins argues that courts should be more permissive in allowing patents to encompass
complementary after-arising technology (e.g., the smart phone) but less permissive for afterarising substitutes (e.g., the facial recognition technology). Collins, supra note 157, at 1300–02.
161 But see Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for
Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 563–64 (2008) (discussing how injunctions can
be tailored to avoid the patentee overcompensation); John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or
Less) than “Off Switches”: Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV 1399, 1455
(2012) (discussing how courts have occasionally issued “moderated injunctions” that permit
some types of limited infringing activity).
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modify the permanent injunction standard and provides different
advantages than a central claiming system would.
A.

Adjusting Injunctions

For many years, courts had automatically awarded prevailing
patentees a permanent injunction against further infringement.
However, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held
that courts should apply the traditional four-factor test they use in other
areas of the law. 162 Although the first three eBay factors focus on the
patentee and the infringer, the fourth eBay factor discusses the public
interest. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence implicitly recognized
that there are circumstances when it is against the public interest to
allow a patent owner to control her invention. 163 This discussion
suggested a shift in focus from one based purely on the property rights
of patentees to a more public-minded analysis. Several scholars have
seized upon this opening to offer proposals that would improve the
public welfare. In one form or another, each of these proposals argues
that permanent injunctions should not be granted when the infringing
product looks significantly different from what the inventor described.
In other words, they all suggest that at least part of the patentee’s
remedy should depend on where the infringement lies upon the
infringement continuum.
Timothy Holbrook has argued that when there is infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, the patentee should not be entitled to
a permanent injunction. 164 Holbrook views infringement under this
doctrine as fundamentally different from literal infringement. Under the
doctrine of equivalents, an accused infringer that does not literally fall
within the boundaries of the claim “may nonetheless be found to
infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between . . . the accused product or
process” and elements of the claim. 165
The most common justification underlying the existence of the
doctrine of equivalents is that it would be unfair to allow someone to
162 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–91 (2006). Those factors are:
(1) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (2) whether there
is an adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardships on the respective parties; and
(4) whether granting an injunction would disservice the public interest. Id. at 391; see also
Chao, supra note 161, at 549–64 (discussing the emerging trends in applying eBay’s four-factor
test).
163 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 396–97 (“When the patented invention is but a small component of
the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply
for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”).
164 Holbrook, supra note 5, at 46–48.
165 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
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escape infringement when she practiced the essence of the invention,
but for some reason the words of the claim did not happen to cover
her. 166 Of course, there are problems with the doctrine of equivalents
too. The doctrine makes it more difficult to ascertain a patent’s
boundaries. 167 Parties cannot just analyze the literal language of a
patent’s claims. They must also determine whether an accused
component that does not fall within the literal scope of the claim
matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element or whether
the component is known to be interchangeable with a claimed
element. 168
Oddly, the doctrine of equivalents has evolved so that it grants
greater protection to patent holders for creations that were not
foreseeable at the time of their patent applications. 169 Consequently,
there can be infringement when the accused device is not found within
precise boundaries of the claim nor closely connected to the
embodiments described in the specification. 170 That means that an
inventor “can exclude others from practicing a technology that she did
not create,” including advancements over the patented invention. 171
Holbrook calls this the “possession paradox.” 172
Under current law, the fact that infringement was under the
doctrine of equivalents does not affect the remedy. All of patent law’s
traditional remedies are available to the patent holder, including
damages and the possibility of a permanent injunction. Holbrook would
reduce the impact of the “possession paradox” by prohibiting the
patentee from receiving a permanent injunction when infringement is

166 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (explaining
that without the doctrine of equivalents an inventor would be left “at the mercy of verbalism”
and the law “would be subordinating substance to form”); see also Holbrook, supra note 5, at
31–35 (discussing how some justify the doctrine of equivalents on the basis of “[c]laim
[c]orrection,” “[e]fficiency [g]rounds and [r]efinement [t]heory,” and “[f]airness to the
[i]nventor”).
167 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002). As
discussed earlier, unclear claims cause the same problems that overbroad claims do because
companies have to worry that the claims will be interpreted broadly. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
168 See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 35–36.
169 Holbrook, supra note 5, at 6; see also Festo, 535 U.S. at 740 (holding that prosecution
history does not bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents when the patentee
demonstrates that the equivalent in question was unforeseeable at the time of the narrowing
amendment); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 101, 120 (2005) (“Indeed, covering equivalent technology not contemplated when the
patent claims were written is one of the major benefits of the doctrine of equivalents.”).
170 See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents does not apply to embodiments
disclosed in the specification but not claimed).
171 Holbrook, supra note 5, at 6.
172 Id. at 2, 7.
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found under the doctrine of equivalents. 173 This proposal would still
leave the patent holder with the ability to recover past damages and an
ongoing royalty.
Holbrook’s proposal would modify patent law so that courts could
respond to broad claims with more than only two results: (1) a patentee
win, entitling the patentee to the typical array of remedies, or (2) a
patentee loss. Under Holbrook’s proposal, a patentee could win but be
denied the ability to obtain a permanent injunction because
infringement was only found under the doctrine of equivalents.
Peter Lee is also concerned about broad claims. 174 But he does not
limit his recommendations to the doctrine of equivalents. Lee suggests
that when significant improvements are found to infringe a patent
(either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents), the patentee
should not be entitled to a permanent injunction. 175 These are
improvements that fall within the scope of a patent’s claims but improve
on the technology in a manner that is not described by the
specification. 176
Lee explains that holders of broad “blocking” patents may end up
preventing the commercialization of later improvements. Ideally, when
patents on an underlying technology and on its improvement are held
by different parties, the parties will be able to negotiate a cross license.
However, Lee points out that the parties often fail to arrive at an
agreement because of high transaction costs or because the holder of the
blocking patent may seek an undue portion of the rents arising from the
improvement. 177
To counteract such market failures, Lee looks to property law’s
accession doctrine for a solution. “According to this doctrine, when an
innocent party improves someone else’s personal property in a way that
significantly enhances its value or changes its nature, the improver may
take title to the improved item, contingent upon compensating the
original owner for the raw materials.” 178 Lee applies the same principles
to patent law and recommends that courts integrate the accession
Id. at 46.
See Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV.
175 (2011).
175 Id. at 202–03.
176 Lee defines both the terms “significant” and “improvement.” First, an improvement
occurs when a party “creat[es] a technology that serves a similar technical objective as the
existing invention, but does so with greater efficiency or enhanced functionality.” Id. at 184.
Second, Lee borrows a definition of “significant” from Mark Lemley. See id. at 185. Lemley
classifies significant improvements as those that are independently patentable over the original
patented invention. Lemley, supra note 5, at 1008–10.
177 Lee, supra note 174, at 180; see also, Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 62, at 1994–2010
(discussing how the threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far
in excess of patent holder’s economic contribution).
178 Lee, supra note 174, at 196.
173
174
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insight into the eBay framework for determining whether to issue a
permanent injunction. 179 The result would be to “deny injunctive relief
when an infringer substantially improves on an underlying patented
invention.”180 Substantial improvers will still have to pay damages.
However, the improver will be able to continue to use the patented
technology by paying the patent holder an ongoing royalty. 181
Finally, Katherine Strandburg also focuses on broad claims that
block improvements. 182 She proposes a multi-faceted patent fair use
defense. 183 One aspect of her proposal places limits on broad claims.
Specifically, certain classes of infringers would be exempt from liability
entirely or at least not be subject to permanent injunction. 184 Among
those classes would be those that substantially improve on the patented
invention. 185 Substantiality would be judged by assessing the relative
sizes of the initial invention and the improvement. Presumably, that
requires a comparison of the improvement with the patent’s
specification, not just its claims. Strandburg has two justifications for
this exemption. First, she compares substantial improvements in patent
law to transformative uses in copyright law and argues “that the public
should not be deprived of a major advance because the initial author
refuses to ‘play along.’” 186 Second, like Peter Lee, she points to various
market failures that prevent the improver from ever receiving a license
to the dominant patent. 187
I agree with all these proposals as far as they go. 188 But the law
needs to go even further. These proposals only offer one way to adjust
the remedy. Under the current law, an overly broad claim results in a
loss for the patentee. If the claim is not too broad, the patentee wins and
is entitled to all the typical remedies. 189 These include money damages
and the possibility of an injunction. Holbrook’s, Lee’s, and Strandburg’s
proposals would make the possibility of an injunction dependent on the

Id. at 212–15.
Id. at 240.
181 Id. at 215 (“[C]ourts applying this proposal would generally compel a defendant to pay
royalties to a pioneer patentee as a condition of ongoing infringement.”).
182 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011).
183 Id. at 293–304.
184 Id. at 293, 300–01.
185 Id. at 297–99.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 298–99.
188 I am only discussing Strandburg’s weaker proposal—exempting certain types of
infringers from the possibility of a permanent injunction. Her stronger proposal—a complete
fair use defense—would not change the number of outcomes. It would narrow the scope of
broad claims so that they do not cover substantial improvements.
189 A win would be a claim construction that encompasses the accused infringer, but does
not invalidate the relevant claims of the patent.
179
180
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nature of the infringement. Of course these proposals only operate on a
single policy lever, the permanent injunction. 190
There is no reason why patent law cannot use money damages as
an additional lever to tune the remedies even more finely. In other
words, money damages should also depend on how close the infringing
product is to the invention found in the patent’s specification (i.e.,
where the infringement lies upon the infringement continuum). As
described in further detail in Part V, that means that a jury would be
instructed to base the amount of damages on how closely the
infringement looks like the embodiments described in the specification.
B.

Central Claiming

The proposal described in this Article relies on the patent’s
specification to tune the remedy that a patentee would receive. 191 This
would radically expand the role the specification plays in patent law.
Under current law, the primary purpose of the specification is to teach
the public how to use the invention. 192 Of course the specification is also
used to interpret the claims, but the claims delineate the patentee’s
property rights. However, the general idea of placing more weight on
the specification is not new.
In two separate articles, Jeanne Fromer and Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley have suggested that patent law should focus less on what
inventors claim and more on what they describe. 193 These
commentators identify a number of problems with our current system
of “peripheral claiming.” 194 They argue that too many resources are
spent drafting claims and interpreting them. 195 What is worse, these
efforts are often wasted because the claims are unclear and thus fail to
190 To be fair, injunctions can be tailored providing a limited amount of flexibility. See
Golden, supra note 161.
191 Presumably, the three proposals regarding permanent injunction would also rely on the
specification and expand its role. For example, even though infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is based on examining each claim limitation, the specification helps us determine
whether some other feature that does not fall within the literal scope of that limitation: serves
the same purpose, has the same function, or achieves the same result. Moreover, assessing
whether an infringement substantially improves on the patented invention would undoubtedly
involve looking at the patent’s specification, not just its claims.
192 See supra notes 70, 87 and accompanying text (describing the enablement and written
description requirements).
193 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9; Fromer, supra note 9.
194 In the current system, the claims define the outer limit of the patentees’ property right.
This approach is referred to as “peripheral claiming.” Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1744.
195 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1761–65 (discussing the costs of claim construction);
Fromer, supra note 9, at 774 (“Drafting patent claims is costly, in large part due to the
abundance of drafted claims and the expensive abstract wording the patentee employs to garner
broad coverage.”).
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give the public adequate notice of the claimed property right. 196 Often
the interpretation of those claims does not even accurately reflect the
fundamental nature of the invention. 197
Consequently, Fromer, Burk, and Lemley recommend that the
United States move toward a system of central claiming. 198 Under a
central claiming approach, claims would not define the scope of the
patentee’s rights. Much as it does now, the specification would describe
the central or prototypical embodiments. But instead of just being used
to help interpret the claim, these exemplars would actually define the
scope of the patent. The patent would cover a broader set of similar
embodiments. 199
While the remedies reform recommended here and central
claiming share some basic traits, their solutions are quite different. First,
central claiming addresses two problems that I do not. Central claiming
would eliminate the costs associated with drafting and interpreting
claims. 200 It also attempts to better align the scope of the patent with the
patentee’s actual invention. 201
Now both the proposal described in this Article and central
claiming attempt to address claim breadth, but they do so using
fundamentally different mechanisms. By placing a greater focus on the
invention, central claiming eliminates the practice of drafting claims far
afield from the invention. 202 In contrast, my proposal accepts that there
will be some very broad claims, but reduces the cost of any infringement
that lies near the edge of those claims.
But central claiming does very little, if anything, about unclear
claims. 203 Indeed, Burk and Lemley admit that central claiming is

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1751–52; Fromer, supra note 9, at 758.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1765 (“The focus on the meaning of individual words in
patent claims drafted by patent lawyers has displaced a focus on what the patentee actually
invented and how significant that invention is.”).
198 Id. at 1747; Fromer, supra note 9, at 719.
199 Fromer, supra note 9, at 727 (“[In central claiming,] the rightsholder describes the
central, or prototypical, set members, but the right tends to cover a broader, similar set of
items.”).
200 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1787 (suggesting that central claiming would lead to
“lower-cost applications and more efficient . . . examinations”); Fromer, supra note 9, at 759.
201 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1787 (“The primary advantage of central claiming is
that it puts the focus on what the patentee actually invented rather than on what patent lawyers
later (often much later) drafted as claims to cover the ground in that invention.”).
202 Id. at 1762 (“If the patent lawsuit were focused on the central features of what the
patentee invented, overclaiming wouldn’t work.”); Fromer, supra note 9, at 775 (noting that
patent examiners often have a difficult time imagining all the embodiments that may fall within
a given claim).
203 See Tun-Jen Chiang, Defining Patent Scope by the Novelty of the Idea, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1211, 1239 (2012) (arguing that central claiming has the same problems of the current
system of peripheral claiming).
196
197
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unlikely to clarify patent rights 204 while Fromer is equivocal. She says
that central claims “might be” more effective at providing adequate
notice to the public because people should understand central claiming
better. 205 In contrast, my proposal accepts that vague claims will always
be with us and attempts to adjust remedies law accordingly.
In sum, advocates of central claiming recommend a fundamental
change in patent law. They would place less weight on a patent’s claims
and more weight on the patent’s specification in infringement
determinations. This Article takes the same tact, but applies it to patent
remedies. This approach leads to a very different result. The primary
benefits of central claiming are eliminating the costs of peripheral
claiming and realigning property rights more closely with the actual
invention. In contrast, my proposal tailors remedies to the different
types of infringement that fall upon the infringement continuum. This
results in a system that is fairer and more predictable. Notably, both
peripheral and central claiming result in binary outcomes with all-ornothing results. Consequently, the reform proposed here could improve
either the current peripheral claiming system or any of the central
claiming proposals.
IV. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The available remedies for patent infringement are money damages
and a permanent injunction. As discussed earlier, others have already
argued that a permanent injunction should not be granted for
infringement that departs too far from what the patent described. These
proposals exemplify the concept of adjusting the patentee’s remedy
based on the proximity of the infringement to the patentee’s invention.
However, they only suggest one coarse adjustment, granting or denying
a permanent injunction. This Article takes the concept further by
proposing to calibrate the patentee’s remedy more precisely with money
damages. To accomplish this goal, there needs to be fundamental
reforms to the way patent law awards damages. This Article proposes to
eliminate the current bifurcated lost-profits/reasonable-royalty regime
and replace it with a royalty framework that calculates damages based
chiefly on the proximity of the infringement to the invention described
in the patent’s specification.

204 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 9, at 1794 (“Central claiming avoids the problem [of
unclear claims], not by offering greater determinacy, but by avoiding the pretense that such
determinacy is possible.”).
205 Fromer, supra note 9, at 776 (“Central claims will not excise the problem of language
ambiguities; but because people appear to build central models of categories in their mind,
central claims might be just as, if not more, effective to provide content notice to the public.”).
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Currently, there are two primary forms of money damages: lost
profits and a reasonable royalty. Under the statute governing patent
damages, a prevailing patentee can receive lost profits. 206 But if the
patentee does not have any lost profits or is unable to prove them, a
reasonable royalty is always available. 207 Both types of damages are
intended to return the patentee to the place she would have occupied
had there been no infringement. 208 However, both precedent209 and
commentators 210 agree that the fundamental purpose underlying patent
law is to promote innovation. To the extent that inventors receive
financial rewards, it is simply a byproduct of encouraging innovation. 211
This concept is found at the constitutional root of our country’s patent
laws. 212 Yet, as Ted Sichelman has complained, patent remedies
jurisprudence overlooks this basic premise. 213 By focusing on restoring
patentees to the position they had prior to any infringement, patent
remedies often ignore the public’s interest in encouraging innovation
that builds on existing patented technology. 214 The result is that both the
current lost profits and reasonable royalty frameworks overcompensate
the patentee. 215
206 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court.”).
207 See id.
208 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) (“[The]
question (is) primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee
have made?” (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.
1958))); Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886) (stating that a patentee’s
damages are “the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what
his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred”).
209 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”).
210 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003) (“The standard rationale of patent law is that it is an
efficient method of enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus
promoting innovation and technological progress.”); Sichelman, supra note 2, at 530–31
(“[A]ny form of private law right afforded to the patentee is purely incidental to the aim of
patent law in promoting innovation.”).
211 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)
(“[T]his court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is ‘to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts’ . . . .” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)).
212 The Constitution authorizes Congress to make laws “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
213 See Sichelman, supra note 2, at 536 (“[The] problem . . . is that the private law remedies
usually associated with tort law—injunctions and compensatory damages—are not always
sensible for optimally encouraging innovation.”).
214 See id.
215 There are also other sources of overcompensation in the current remedies regime that are
not caused by the way patent law calculates damages. See Bernard Chao, The Case for
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This Article takes the public interest more seriously and argues that
patent law should replace the current bifurcated lost-profits/reasonableroyalty framework with a single scheme that is primarily based on the
proximity the infringement has to the actual invention. Under this
proposal, the award a patentee would receive would more closely
measure what it actually contributed to the infringing product. In the
next two sections, this Article reviews the lost-profits/reasonable-royalty
framework and explains how each theory focuses on making patent
holders whole instead of optimizing innovation. This Article then
proposes a single royalty remedies framework that balances incentives
for both early innovators and improvers.
A.

Lost Profits

Generally, a lost profits theory of damages concerns itself with the
money the patentee would have made, but for the infringement. This
measure of damages applies when the infringer competes with the
patentee. The basic framework for lost profits consists of a four-part
test. To obtain lost profits, the patentee must show: “(1) demand for the
patented product, (2) [the] absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, (3) [her] manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit
the demand, and (4) the amount of profit [s]he would have made.”216 If
a patentee satisfies these four requirements, she has shown what profits
she would have realized had there been no infringement. Thus, lost
profits simply attempts to restore the patentee to the position she would
have enjoyed had the infringement never occurred.
Unfortunately, the theory of lost profits makes no attempt to
properly allocate incentives between the patentee and the infringer.217
The theory is only concerned about the profits the patentee lost. It is not
concerned about leaving the infringer with any return on its efforts.
Consider the following hypothetical. Assume that the patentee,
SmartCo, sells smart phones in a two-supplier market and has a patent
on some aspect of touchscreen technology that is often used in these
phones. The infringer, and SmartCo’s only competitor, CellCo, uses the
same touchscreen technology in its competing smart phones and sells a
million phones. If SmartCo is seeking lost profits, it will try to prove that
Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 116–18 (2011) (explaining how juries may
overestimate the value a component patent contributes to a complex product); Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 62, at 2008–09 (explaining how the threat of an injunction leads to
systematic overcompensation). This Article does not address these problems.
216 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978).
217 See Scotchmer, supra note 35, at 30 (“The challenge is to reward early innovators fully for
the technological foundation they provide to later innovators, but to reward later innovators
adequately for their improvements and new products as well.”).
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it would have sold an additional million smart phones, but for CellCo’s
infringement. 218 If CellCo made $10 profits per smart phone, SmartCo’s
profits were likely to be in that same neighborhood. Thus, SmartCo will
probably recover $10,000,000—more or less, the profits that CellCo
made.
This award makes sense when the patent provides all the value for
the competing products (i.e., the patentee and the infringer added
nothing of value to the patented technology to make their smart
phones). 219 However, modern electronic devices often involve hundreds
if not thousands of patented technologies. 220 Moreover, infringers rarely
just copy patented technology. 221 They almost always contribute
something. 222 Some infringers develop unforeseen variations and/or
improvements of the patented technology. Others may combine the
patented technology with existing technologies that have no connection
to the patent. 223 Both of these types of infringing activity regularly occur
in the context of complex electronic devices. 224 Still others add more
vanilla value like “know-how, materials, and marketing efforts.” 225
In the hypothetical discussed above, both the patentee and the
infringer’s smart phones undoubtedly would have used other patented
(and unpatented) technology. Smart phones contain fourth-generation
(4G) communications technology, global position systems (GPS),
mobile browsers, and software applications like Facebook and iTunes.
Yet, the patentee would recover all the smart phone profits because it
patented touch screen technology. Thus, the current lost profits
framework overcompensates the patentee in all but the simplest cases. 226
This, in turn, under incentivizes infringers that hope to improve on the
patented technology. 227
The reason why lost profits systematically overcompensates
patentees is because the remedy is not designed to promote innovation.
For the purposes of this hypothetical, I assume a simplified two-supplier world.
See Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60
STAN. L. REV. 263, 272 & n.39 (2007) (suggesting that an award of lost profit overcompensates
the patentee because the patentee receives “profits earned from value it did not create”).
220 See Chao, supra note 215, at 105–06 (discussing various studies that suggest that there are
hundreds if not thousands of patents involved in today’s everyday electronic devices).
221 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV.
1421, 1424 (2009) (finding that copying is quite rare in patent litigation).
222 Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 655, 663–64 (2009) (“[I]t is effectively never the case that the patent is responsible for all
of the value of a product.”).
223 See Collins, supra note 157, at 1247–51.
224 See Love, supra note 219, at 289.
225 Lemley, supra note 222, at 663 (pointing out that infringers often add more mundane
value like “know-how, materials, and marketing efforts”).
226 In contrast, a patent on a drug’s active ingredient may really be the basis for the
consumer demand. Thus, the rule may make sense for pharmaceutical industry patents.
227 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 35, at 843–44.
218
219
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Rather, its goal is to make the patentee whole by returning the patentee
to the place she would have occupied had there been no infringement.
However, this type of “make-whole” remedy is fundamentally
inconsistent with patent law’s goal of encouraging innovation rooted in
the Constitution. 228 If patent remedies were really structured to
encourage all innovation—infringers that add value to the patent would
be allowed to retain some of their profits.
Breaking down the problem further, the current lost-profits
framework improperly places the focus on the patentee’s entire product
even when its patent only covers one aspect of the product. It looks at
the products the patentee would have sold but for the infringer’s sales.
In contrast, a remedies framework that is concerned about innovation
would compare the patent to the infringing product to determine what
contribution the patent made to the product. It would then apportion
the profits between the patentee and the infringer to provide incentives
for both the patentee and any contributions the infringer added.
B.

Reasonable Royalties

When lost profits are unavailable, the patentee may seek a
reasonable royalty. Like lost profits, a reasonable royalty award concerns
itself with the money the patentee would have made, but for the
infringement. This typically occurs when the patentee does not compete
with the infringer. For example, many patents are asserted by entities
whose sole business is to assert patents. 229 These entities do not sell
products and have no profits to lose. Even when there is competition,
patentees may seek a royalty when they cannot prove lost profits or
when those profits are just too small.
Patent law uses the Georgia-Pacific test to calculate reasonable
royalty awards. 230 Jurors are instructed to ascertain the royalty that the
228 Sichelman, supra note 2, at 518–19 (characterizing patent remedies as tort like, not
innovation based).
229 See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328–31 (2010) (describing how
“patent assertion entities” behave).
230 See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). Reasonable royalty awards can also be calculated using
“the so-called ‘analytical approach.’” See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); accord JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 3:8 (2013). But
this test is almost never used. Therefore, I will not address it. See Christopher B. Seaman,
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU
L. REV. 1661, 1673 (“Today, nearly all reasonable royalty awards are based on the fifteen-factor
[Georgia-Pacific] test . . . .”). The Model Patent Jury Instructions from the Federal Circuit Bar
Association does not even mention the “analytical method.” See FED. CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N,
MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Feb. 2012), available at http://memberconnections.com/
olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9004/Library/2012%20Updated%20FCBA%20Model%20Patent%20
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parties would have agreed upon had they successfully negotiated a
license just before infringement began. The hypothetical negotiation
assumes that the patent at issue is valid and infringed. Of course this is
different from what would happen during any actual negotiations where
some discount would be applied for the possibility that the patent is not
infringed or invalid. 231 There are a mind-boggling fifteen factors that are
used to calculate the royalty under this analysis. 232
Jury%20Instructions.pdf. Rather, it defines a reasonable royalty in terms of the hypothetical
negotiation. See id. § 6.6.
231 See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 229–30 (2005) (explaining why the hypothetical
negotiation needs to make these counterfactual assumptions to avoid under-compensation).
232 See Ga.-Pac., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. The factors are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent
in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted
or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured
product may be sold.
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether
they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether
they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of
the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales
of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial
success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if
any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention
or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had
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Although this framework differs from how lost profits are
calculated, the reasonable royalty is still a kind of make-whole remedy.
Instead of trying to restore the patentee to the position she would have
occupied had there been no infringing conduct, a reasonable royalty
award attempts to place the patentee in the position she would have
been had the infringer taken a license and continued its conduct.
Assuming that the goal is to maximize innovation, even this approach
overcompensates patentees. It does so by intentionally awarding
damages that are not properly attributable to the patented invention. In
addition, there are unintended ways that the reasonable royalty
framework operates in practice that allow patentees to receive even
larger recoveries.
First, the entire market value rule explicitly allows patentees to
recover damages based on the value of the entire product, not just the
value of the patented component. Ostensibly, the rule only applies
“where the patented feature creates the ‘basis for [the] customer
demand’” of the entire product. 233 However, as discussed earlier, that is
almost never true. 234 Particularly for the high-tech industry, many
different technologies and contributions are necessary for any given
product. Nonetheless, the entire market value rule is routinely applied
to cases where value can be attributed to things beyond the patent at
issue. 235 In practice, that means patentees are overcompensated. 236
Additionally, the infringer may have even made substantial
contributions when the patented feature is the basis for the consumer
demand. Recall the ‘647 patent. It described a computer that recognized
e-mail addresses, dates, and names in documents and automatically
allowed the user to perform an action. 237 The claims appeared to reach
substantially further than these embodiments. So software that
been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount
which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license
to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—
would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable
profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was
willing to grant a license.
Id.

233 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
234 See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text.
235 See Love, supra note 219, at 277 (describing cases where the entire market value rule is
applied even though “unpatented components of the accused device have independent
economic value”).
236 Lemley, supra note 222, at 664 (“But since there is always at least some value to the
defendant’s product not attributable to the patent, any application of the entire market value
rule in a reasonable royalty setting necessarily overcompensates the patent owner by giving it
value not in fact attributable to the patent.”); see Love, supra note 219, at 289 (concluding that
the entire market value rule makes little sense “in the arena of complex electronic devices”).
237 See supra text accompanying notes 29–32.

CHAO.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

THE INFRINGEMENT CONTINUUM

4/10/2014 2:21 PM

1403

recognizes facial images and automatically indexes them may be covered
by a broad claim. Assume this feature is the basis for the consumer
demand for a digital photo frame, a device that allows a user to display a
variety of digital images. The entire market rule would apply and the
patentee would be able to capture royalties based upon the infringing
digital frames that contain the facial recognition software. Nonetheless,
it is clear that substantial contributions beyond the ‘647 patent went into
the digital photo frames. It may be the infringer’s own contributions.
But more likely, facial recognition technology was the result of
cumulative incremental efforts from numerous different entities.238
Unfortunately, the entire market value rule ends up attributing all of
these contributions to the patentee because they fall within the scope of
the broad claim.
Mark Lemley and Brian Love have pointed out how this problem is
exacerbated by the manner in which “convoyed sales” affect reasonable
royalty calculations. 239 The sixth Georgia-Pacific factor instructs the jury
to consider “[t]he effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting
sales of other products of the licensee; that existing value of the
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented
items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.” 240
Consequently, reasonable royalties can be increased because of sales of
related items that are not covered by the patent at issue. Again this
analysis fails to consider what else others contributed. For example,
these products may have been covered by the defendant’s own patents.
This is especially likely to occur when these other products are not the
infringing product themselves. Once again, this shows how the current
framework does not concern itself with leaving any incentives to
develop technology that works with existing patented technology.
Although Georgia-Pacific does provide some basis for the jury to
consider the relative value of the patent, practical problems render these
factors ineffectual. Factor nine discusses advantages of the patent over
238 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 25–26 (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balancecompetition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf (“[T]echnology developed in
industries such as semiconductors, computer hardware, and software can contain a large
number of incremental innovations.”).
239 Lemley, supra note 222, at 665 (“[Allowing royalty rates to consider convoyed sales]
suffers from the same flaw as the application of the entire market value rule: it attributes the
value of unpatented technologies to the patent owner in circumstances in which the patent
owner would not have made sales of those technologies, and, therefore, in which the infringer
would have had to pay to develop or acquire the technology from somewhere else.”); Brian J.
Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L
REV. 909, 931 (2009) (“[T]he ‘convoyed sales’ doctrine . . . overcompensate[s] patent owners by
allowing them to earn a royalty on value they did not create.”).
240 Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified
by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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old modes and devices and factor thirteen discusses the portion of the
profit attributable to the invention as opposed to non-patented
elements. 241 Both of these factors suggest that juries should consider the
relative worth of the patent, but that does not happen in practice. As
Chris Seaman suggested “at trial, juries hear extensive evidence from the
patent holder regarding the critical importance of the patented
invention but often receive little or no information regarding ‘all the
other things that contribute to the success’ of the accused product.”242
This may be caused in part by the scarcity of trial days. Patent litigants
probably do not have the time to offer all the evidence they want. In
addition, there are tactical reasons why defendants want to concentrate
the time they do have challenging liability instead of rebutting
damages. 243 Plainly, juries really do not consider the other contributions
that helped form the infringing product. The result is that patent
remedies do not account for the public’s interest in encouraging
innovation that builds on existing patented technology.
V. REFORMING REMEDIES
For patent law to properly incentivize technology that builds upon
(or works with) existing patented technology, the law needs to employ a
more balanced perspective. Specifically, when awarding damages the
fact finder should consider both: what damages the patentee should be
awarded and what money the infringer should retain. The infringement
continuum provides a useful device for considering these issues. Some
infringement looks just like what the patentee invented. Other
infringement lies on the outer boundaries of the property right. Of
course still other forms lie somewhere between these two poles.
Patentees clearly deserve more compensation when infringement looks
just like what the patentee invented. Correspondingly, infringers
deserve to retain more of their own proceeds when they provide larger
contributions. This occurs when the infringing products depart
significantly from what the patentee invented.
A.

The Framework

I suggest that patent law consider a framework that adjusts the
amount of damages by the proximity the infringer’s use has to the use
Id.
Seaman, supra note 230, at 1697–98.
243 See Chao, supra note 215, at 117–18 (discussing how defendants fear that presenting an
alternative damages case may be interpreted by the jury as a concession on liability).
241
242
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envisioned by the inventor. This Article sets forth the basic framework;
additional details and nuances could be added as parties and courts
apply the notion of an infringement continuum in awarding damages.
But I can identify several important characteristics of how patent law
should use the infringement continuum to calculate monetary damages.
First, patent law should do away with the bifurcated lostprofits/reasonable-royalty regime and instead award all successful
patent plaintiffs a form of royalty. Second, I would discard much of
current reasonable royalty framework and replace it with a “new”
royalty that would be based primarily on where the infringement lies
upon the infringement continuum. Third, this “position” can be
calculated by comparing the infringing product to the patent
specification. The law should use this result to determine the royalty the
patentee is awarded.
The first characteristic of my proposal is to do away with lost
profits entirely. By its very nature, awarding lost profits fixes a problem
that patent law was not intended to address. The theory of lost profits is
very much a tort theory intended to make an injured party whole. 244 But
if patent law really does not care about enriching inventors, 245 then
awarding lost profits to aggrieved patentees makes no sense. The
question should not be: how does the law make the patentee whole? But
rather, what compensation is needed to properly incentivize innovation?
That means considering incentives for both the patentee and any of the
infringer’s contributions. A properly framed royalty-based calculation is
better suited to accomplish this goal because it can look beyond what
the infringer “lost.” But the existing reasonable royalty framework does
not do this.
Consequently, the second characteristic of my proposal is to
jettison much of current reasonable royalty law and replace it with a
calculation based on the infringement continuum. That means
eliminating the entire market value rule. Since a patented feature almost
never serves as the entire basis for the consumer demand, the rule does
not apply to the vast majority of cases. 246 Moreover, when a patented
feature forms the basis for the consumer demand, the rule effectively
gives all the credit to the patentee. That does not make sense when the
infringer developed a new and improved variation of the patented
invention.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text.
246 The exception is where the patentee contributed the entire value of the infringing
product. But that is an easy case that the current proposal handles well. When the infringer
adds nothing of value, the patentee should be allowed to recover most of the infringer’s
proceeds. To the extent that the infringer is allowed to retain some of its proceeds, that should
be based on non-technical contributions like marketing and manufacturing operations.
244
245
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The new royalty calculation also needs to discard the GeorgiaPacific test. There are a number of reasons why this test is not well
designed to optimize innovation. First, like lost profits, framing a
reasonable royalty based on a hypothetical negotiation is a kind of
make-whole remedy. It tries to restore the patentee to the position she
would have occupied had the infringer taken a license. But as others
have noted “a patentee need not reap the entire social value of its
invention in order to be sufficiently incentivized.” 247 On a more
practical level, juries cannot be expected to make sense of a fifteenfactor test. 248 In addition, many of those factors are not concerned with
the public good. For example, factors four (the licensor’s licensing
practices), five (the commercial relationship between the patentee and
the infringer), and fifteen (the amount the parties would have agreed to)
all consider the relationship of the patentee and the infringer. 249 A
patentee may wish to keep its competitor from using a patented
technology and only license it for a higher fee. But it may be in the
public interest to have the competitor include the technology in its
product for a smaller fee. 250 In sum, royalties that are calculated using
the infringement continuum will look quite different than royalties
under the Georgia-Pacific test.
The “new” reasonable royalty would calculate damages based on
where the infringement lies on the infringement continuum. That
means the patentee will receive a higher royalty when the infringement
looks very much like what the patentee invented. The corollary is that
the infringer will retain more of its own proceeds when the
infringement looks very different. This should occur when the
infringer’s contribution is greater. 251
Of course this determination cannot be made by comparing the
claims to the infringing devices. Claims merely list properties; they do
not look like anything tangible. To determine where an infringing
product lies on the infringement continuum, the infringing product
247 Sichelman, supra note 2, at 552; see also Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property,
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046 (2005) (“The assumption that intellectual property
owners should be entitled to capture the full social surplus of their invention runs counter to
our economic intuitions in every other segment of the economy.”).
248 Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable
Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 628 (2010) (“[The Georgia-Pacific test] overloads the
jury with factors to consider that may be irrelevant, overlapping, or even contradictory.”);
Seaman, supra note 230, at 1688 (“Georgia-Pacific gives juries little guidance on how to weigh
the numerous factors and reach a decision on an appropriate royalty.”).
249 See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified by 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
250 See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the GeorgiaPacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 36 (2008) (arguing that value of the patent
should be judged from a market perspective, not the perspective of the patentee and infringer).
251 Alternatively, the infringer could be relying on contributions from third parties.
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must be compared to the patent’s specification. The degree of similarity
can then be used to calculate the royalty.
B.

Benefits

Incentive royalties addresses the problem of unclear and unduly
broad claims. Although the reform will not clarify claim scope or
narrow unduly broad claims, it will ameliorate the problems caused by
these types of claims. As discussed earlier, the goal of the patent system
is to maximize innovation. Unduly broad claims thwart this goal. When
claims reach too deeply into the infringement continuum and cover
products that look very little like what the patent describes, innovation
can suffer. Innovators are less willing to build on patented technology.
This problem is exacerbated when damage awards are high and do not
reflect contributions that the infringer added to the patented invention.
My proposal directly addresses this problem. While the current
lost-profits/reasonable-royalty framework is just concerned with
providing incentives for the patentee, the proposed reform also allows
for incentives for those that build on existing patented technology.
When infringers are making their own contributions that build on
patented technology, their products will look less like what the patentee
invented (i.e., the specification). In those situations, the patentee will
recover less so that the infringer can receive some benefit for its
innovation.
Since this solution does not curb claim scope, it does not solve the
problem of unduly broad claims. Some patentees will still be able to
successfully assert their patents against products that are fundamentally
different from the patented inventions. However, their recoveries
should be much smaller because those kinds of infringements will lie
deep along the continuum. This in turn should make follow-on
innovation more likely.
The proposal should also reduce the problem of unclear claims.
Figure 4 below illustrates the problem under the current system. The
different types of infringement that lie upon the infringement
continuum are found on the horizontal x-axis. The magnitude of the
patentee’s recovery, D, is shown on the vertical y-axis. D represents the
damages a patentee receives under the current bifurcated lostprofits/reasonable-royalty system. The shaded area represents
uncertainty. Since uncertainty generally lies at the outer boundaries of a
claim, the shaded area is shown to the right. Initially, no one knows
whether the patent will be interpreted to have a narrower or broader
scope.
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Figure 4
So long as the infringer falls within the scope of the claim, the

patentee’s recovery is D. But as soon as the infringer falls outside the
scope of the claim, the patentee recovers nothing. This suggests that
damages are not based on where the infringement lies on the
infringement continuum. Thus, when either party incorrectly
anticipates whether there is infringement of a valid claim, the size of its
error is D.
Now consider the effects of uncertainty when royalties are
calculated relying on the infringement continuum. Figure 5 shows that
the patentee’s recovery decreases as the infringement looks less like
what is described by the patent’s specification. At the outer edge of its
claim, the patentee’s potential recovery ranges from d1 to d2. In either
case, both d1 and d2 are substantially less than D, which represents the
make-whole damages awarded under the current system of lost
profits/reasonable royalties. Likewise, the cost of incorrectly anticipating
whether there is infringement of a valid claim is also between d1 to d2.
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Figure 5

Reducing the costs of legal uncertainty provides several benefits. 252
First, when the cost of making a mistake is smaller, companies will be
less likely to forego technology that they were entitled to use. 253 That
benefits both the companies themselves and the consuming public.
Products are more likely to contain the best technology. At the same
time, companies are less likely to pay for patent licenses they do not
need. 254 This also reduces the costs to the end consumers.
C.

Exemplary Implementations

So far, this Article has only discussed the theory of basing remedies
on the infringement continuum. This section sets forth a few possible
examples. In its simplest form, a single score could be used to assess the
overall similarity between the infringing product and the patent’s
specification. But by describing a slightly more complex example, this
Article illustrates how nuanced the proposed framework can be. As
discussed earlier, similarity can be considered in (at least) two
dimensions—how far the infringer has changed the basic invention and
how much the infringer added to that invention. 255 Kevin Collins
characterized the former type of developments as substitutes and the

252 For a general discussion of the costs of legal uncertainty, see John E. Calfee & Richard
Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965
(1984).
253 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
255 See supra text accompanying notes 157–58.
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latter as complements. 256 We could ask the fact finder to measure
differences in these dimensions by considering percentages. 257 One
hundred percent describes infringement that is identical to what is
disclosed in the specification. One percent describes an infringing
product that bears almost no resemblance to anything described in the
specification. 258 The substitute similarity score and complement
similarity score can be combined to determine what percentage of the
proceeds the patentee should receive. For the current analysis,
“proceeds” should be thought of as the infringer’s profits. 259 The result
can be characterized by the following formula:
Royalty = S x C x Proceeds 260

Looking at the ‘647 patent example again, we can illustrate how this
proposal operates through two examples. First, consider a smart phone
that recognizes e-mail addresses in a document and allows the user to
automatically put them in his address book. The ‘647 patent disclosed
the e-mail recognition technology in the context of a personal
computer, but not a smart phone. 261 Thus, the e-mail features are very
similar to what the patent describes. In other words, the infringer adds
very little to the way the patent already handles e-mail addresses and the
substitution similarity score should be high. Let us assume that the
substitute similarity score, S, is 90%. 262 In contrast, smart phones were
unknown at the time the ‘647 patent was filed. Moreover, they clearly
contain many contributions unrelated to the gist of the ‘647 patent. Let
us assume that the complement similarity score, C, is 5%. The result
would be that the patentee would be entitled to 4.5% (i.e., 90% x 5%) of
the infringer’s proceeds.
Next let us consider a digital picture frame with facial recognition
technology that allows a user to automatically display selected pictures
of family members. The ‘647 patent does not describe either digital
picture frames or facial recognition technology. Thus, the substitution
256 See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text (discussing substitutes and
complements).
257 This approach is not without problems. Collins himself acknowledges that “[i]dentifying
the ‘spirit’ of an invention is an information-intensive and error-prone exercise.” Collins, supra
note 157, at 1237.
258 Zero percent describes a situation where there is no infringement and it is not available
for a determination of damages. If the fact finder is already determining the monetary damages,
there is already a finding of infringement.
259 Others may suggest that proceeds should refer to revenue so that infringers that suffer
losses still pay some compensation. As long as the damages formulation makes some allowance
for the infringer’s costs, that does not change the basic point of assessing damages based on the
infringement continuum.
260 S represents the substitution similarity score and C represents the complement similarity
score.
261 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
262 Ideally, 100% will be reserved for direct copying.
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similarity score, S, and the complement similarity score, C, should be
very low. Assume that the fact finder gives the inventors of the ‘647
patent a little more credit for the digital picture frame than for the facial
recognition technology so that S = 2% and C = 5%. The patentee royalty
would be 0.1% (i.e., 2% x 5%) of the infringer’s proceeds. This example
illustrates how the patentee’s recovery diminishes when the infringing
product looks less like what the patentee invented.
The example outlined above is fairly simple. There are many
variations that could be used. For example, Collins also suggested that it
is more appropriate to allow claims to encompass after-arising
technology with properties that are complements rather than
substitutes. 263 Under that view, a broad claim from the ‘647 patent
should be allowed to encompass smart phones with the ability to
recognize e-mail addresses and automatically allow a user to send an email to that address. However, the claim should not be allowed to cover
devices that use facial recognition technology to allow a user to sort
photos. Although Collins’s insight relates to liability (i.e., whether there
is infringement), it can also be used to tune the remedy. In other words,
the preceding formula could be modified to include a coefficient, s,
which adjusts the relative importance of substitutes and complements.
Royalty = (s x S) x C x Proceeds

If s were .5, that would suggest that the law gives an infringer more
credit for contributions that change the heart of the invention (i.e.,
substitute for the primary concept) and less credit for contributions that
are complements (i.e., change features that are peripheral to the heart of
the invention).
Moreover, there may well be other proposals that should be folded
into a new royalty calculation. For example, Amy Landers suggests that
damages be apportioned based on the incremental value the patented
invention adds to the prior art. 264 This prevents a patentee from
receiving compensation for earlier third-party inventions. Hopefully,
this will avoid royalty stacking problems, where companies are forced to
pay multiple patent holders for the same technology. 265 Lander’s
proposal can be combined with the previous example by simply
introducing a term I, which represents the incremental value of the

See Collins, supra note 157, at 1302.
Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential Invention,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2012). As Landers recognizes, the basis for her proposal is
already rooted in the law, but has been lost in the complex Georgia-Pacific test. See id. at 489–
91; see also Lefstin, supra note 68, at 886 n.194 (suggesting the patentee’s remedy be limited
“[i]f the claimed invention is only a trivial advance over the prior art”).
265 Landers, supra note 264, at 473–74.
263
264
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patented invention over the prior art. 266 A value of one would suggest
that there is no useful prior art. As the value of the patented invention’s
contribution decreases so does I. 267 The resulting formula would be:
Royalty = I x (S x C) x Proceeds 268

For the most part, adding the coefficient I should reduce royalty
awards. This reflects value that is attributed to the prior art. Of course if
the prior art is covered by any unexpired patents, those patentees may
be entitled to some of the infringers proceeds too.
The point of this discussion is not to endorse any particular
variation, but merely to show that the proposed reform is neither
complete nor exclusive. Rather, this Article describes a general
framework for reforming patent remedies based on the infringement
continuum. This proposal manages incentives for innovation far better
than the current system. But there may well be other refinements that
should be added.
CONCLUSION
The problem of overbroad claims is one of the most important and
intractable problems in patent law. Prior proposals have attempted to
address this problem by changing the various doctrines that limit claim
scope. This Article outlines a different tact. It assumes that these
troublesome claims will remain with us. With this perspective in mind,
this Article proposes a fundamental reform to patent remedies to
ameliorate the effects of overbroad claims.
This proposed reform is novel in two respects. First, it rejects
current patent remedies as wrongly attempting to restore patentees to
the place they would have occupied had there been no infringement
(i.e., a tort law view). Instead, this Article points out that the purpose of
patent law is to maximize innovation (i.e., a regulatory view).
Consequently, the proposal takes into account incentives for both
patentees and any infringers that build on a patentee’s work. Second, the
proposal ties patent disclosure principles to the remedies patent law
provides. Thus, it elevates the importance of a patent’s specification by
making it part of the damages calculation.

266 This calculation could be far more nuanced by thinking of “improvement” as a
continuum much like the infringement continuum described in this Article. For the current
purposes, it is sufficient to consider a simpler view of incremental improvement.
267 “I” should always be greater than zero. A value of zero would suggest that the invention
yields no benefit over the prior art.
268 A formula reflecting Collins’s, Landers’s, and my proposal would be Royalty = I x (s x S)
x C x Proceeds.
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The proposed reform should have two primary benefits. First, by
calibrating damages to the contributions made by both the patentee and
infringer, this proposal will optimize incentives for both early
innovators and those that would build on basic technology. Second, the
proposal should reduce the cost of unclear claims. Since the problem of
unclear claims looms largest at the outer edges of a claim’s scope and
because the proposal reduces damages at these edges, any errors
associated with unclear claims are likewise reduced.

